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SOFT AND HARD STRATEGIES: THE ROLE OF 
BUSINESS IN THE CRAFTING OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW
Susan Block-Lieb?
What motivates the choice between hard and soft law in the drafting of 
international commercial law, and what role does business play in the pref-
erence between the two?1 Broad disagreement exists in international rela-
tions (“IR”) and international law (“IL”) commentary as to motivations for 
reliance on soft international law. Traditionally, this commentary casts a 
wide gaze across efforts to draft both international public and private law. 
This Article instead argues that narrowing the focus of the conversation to 
consider only international commercial lawmaking sharpens the debate 
about the use of hard and soft law. In the past, this debate focused only on 
states’ interests in crafting international law. Shifting the conversation to 
look specifically at international commercial lawmaking invites examina-
tion of the involvement of both public and private actors. It particularly in-
vites examination of the “mechanisms, extent and effect” of participation by 
private commercial actors—businesses, financial institutions, and the inter-
national associations that represent their interests—in this process.2
IR and IL literatures mostly distinguish between hard and soft interna-
tional law along three dimensions—obligation, precision, and delegation—
? Cooper Family Professor in Urban Legal Issues, Fordham Law School. Many 
thanks to John Pottow and all the participants in the University of Michigan Law School con-
ference on “The Role of Soft Law in International Insolvency and Commercial Law.” I am 
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1. I use the phrase “international commercial law” in this Article to refer to a subset of 
international private law governing commercial transactions involving trade in goods and ser-
vices, including the law governing the transport of such goods and the payment and financing 
for the payment of such goods. The phrase is sometimes used to cover the law governing a 
broader range of financial transactions than those dedicated to the purchase of goods; it is also 
mostly limited to transactions between businesses and thus excludes consumer protection 
laws. I do not look to resolve either ambiguity in this Article. This cluster of issues currently 
engages the lawmaking efforts of several global lawmakers: the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (which refers to itself as “UNIDROIT”), and the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law. For deeper analysis of these international organizations and their lawmak-
ing efforts, see SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CRAFTING OF GLOBAL MARKETS (2017). This us-
age modernizes the phrase “trade law” initially used by UNCITRAL. Id. at 1 n.1. 
2. For a similar inquiry into the role of businesses, albeit their role in the making of 
multilateral treaties—that is, “hard” international laws, see Melissa J. Durkee, The Business of 
Treaties, 63 UCLA L. REV. 264 (2016).
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that, together, describe the concept of legalization.3 In this context, “obliga-
tion” asks whether states are bound to a rule such that a failure of compli-
ance would subject them to scrutiny under the rules and procedures of inter-
national law;4 “precision” means that the “rules unambiguously define the 
conduct they authorize, require or proscribe[;]”5 “[d]elegation” refers to the 
notion that the states obligated under such precise rules have also agreed to 
be bound to some dispute mechanism granted authority to implement, inter-
pret, and apply those rules.6 An international obligation is said to be cast in 
“hard” law, therefore, if there is no wiggle room either in terms of whether a
state is bound by a clearly articulated obligation or in terms of how states 
can be made to carry out such obligations. In contrast, international legisla-
tion is described as “soft” either if it is imprecise, imposes no obligation, or 
fails to specify how these precise obligations can be enforced against non-
compliant states. How to enforce international legislation is the difficult 
part: if states are sovereign, then, by definition, they cannot be made to do 
anything they do not want to do.
On the basis of this definition, different schools of thought take issue 
with different aspects of soft law. Positive legal scholars like Prosper Weil 
and Jan Klabbers have little use for soft law, viewing it as “destabiliz[ing],”7
“detrimental,”8 or, at the very least, logically flawed.9 Rational institutional-
ists differ. They see a realist’s logic to non-binding soft laws, emphasizing 
that soft international law permits states to identify and signal their interests 
for international actors and perhaps lay out the possibility for future com-
mitments.10 Andrew Guzman, for example, argues that states rationally 
3. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Govern-
ance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000) (developing the concept of “legalization” in distinguishing 
between hard and soft international law); see also Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of 
Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401 (2000) (expanding upon the definition of “legalization”); 
Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE 21, 30 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (adopting a similar six 
factor test for soft/hard law).
4. David M. Trubek et al., ‘Soft Law’, ‘Hard Law’, and EU Integration, in LAW AND 
NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 65, 69 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 
2006).
5. Abbott et al., supra note 3, at 401 (italicization omitted).
6. Trubek et al., supra note 4, at 69–70.
7. See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J.
INT’L L. 413, 423 (1983).
8. Jan Klabbers, The Undesirability of Soft Law, 67 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 381, 383 
(1998). 
9. Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Comple-
ments, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 713 (2010) (de-
scribing positive legal scholars as viewing soft international law as “logically flawed” and
citing Jan Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 167, 181 (1996) (ad-
vocating retention of the “traditional binary conception of law”)).
10. See Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT’L 
ORG. 495, 508–13 (1991) (referring to “binding” international law as a “misleading hyperbo-
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choose soft law to minimize the reputational costs that may result from a 
potential violation of law, whether due to uncertainty or otherwise.11 With-
out being constrained by some enforceable international commitment, these 
commentators argue, a rational state may announce its interests through soft 
law formats that are intended more to communicate preferences and inten-
tions than to establish enforceable commitments; a state’s decision to format 
its statement of intentions in the form of a treaty is, say rationalists, a way 
for nations to signal their relative seriousness about a topic.
By contrast, constructivists like David Trubeck focus less on the draft-
ing and enforcement of an international agreement and more on its imple-
mentation.12 Constructivists’ sociological perspective on soft international 
law addresses “the gap between the law-in-the-books and the law-in-action” 
and emphasizes soft law’s impact on states’ behavior rather than states’ ob-
ligations.13 Pragmatists like Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack similarly 
take a long view when considering the benefits of soft laws.14 They argue 
that “actors, working ex ante, use agreements having different characteris-
tics to further particular aims.”15 They also emphasize that “[t]hese different 
types of agreements can have unpredicted effects, ex post, leading to new 
cycles of international lawmaking.”16 This focus on the recursive cycles of 
le.” But, describing the usage of “binding” as one that matters since it signals a nation’s will-
ingness to commit reputational capital to an international agreement). 
11. Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L.
579, 582 (2005) [hereinafter, Guzman, Design]; see also ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW 
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 71–111 (2008) (arguing that, 
when states enter agreements, they want their promises to be credible). 
12. See Trubek et al., supra note 4, at 75 (distinguishing rationalist and constructivist 
scholars’ perspectives on soft law and finding that “constructivist scholars look at how institu-
tions facilitate constitutive processes such as persuasion, learning, argumentation, and sociali-
sation”).
13. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 713 (describing constructivist schools of 
thought); see also Trubek et al., supra note 4, at 75 (same, specifically as relates to European 
lawmaking).
14. See Shaffer & Pollack, D note 9, at 728 (“examin[ing] the problem of implementing 
international agreements, [and] arguing that implementation challenges set off recursive cy-
cles of international lawmaking, with hard and soft law sometimes being used as complements 
and sometimes as antagonists.”).
15. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 714.
16. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 714. Shaffer and Pollack’s reference to the long 
view in theories of international law harkens to Carruthers and Halliday’s theory of recur-
sivity. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 742–43; see also TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE 
G. CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT (2009) (relying on recursivity theory in describing international 
efforts to set corporate insolvency law standards in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis); 
BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS: THE MAKING OF 
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES (1998) (same). In 
subsequent work, Halliday and Shaffer together elaborate on the influence of recursivity in the 
making of what they refer to as “transnational legal orders”—also referred to as “TLOs.” For 
an extensive definition of a TLO, see TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, ch. 1, at 31–34 (Ter-
ence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2016). Halliday and I also write about recursivity 
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lawmaking also led Halliday and me to argue that soft laws are often part of 
an incremental strategy of soft law implementation in which hard laws may 
follow the enactment of soft laws and that states may weave soft and hard 
laws together to broaden the reach of lawmaking initiatives.17
Most of the existing IR and IL commentary—from positivists, rational 
institutionalists, and constructivists—focuses exclusively on a state-centered 
set of contentions. It focuses on states’ interests in soft law for international 
coordination and leaves out any question of private interests in the promul-
gation of soft international law. Although this analysis is widely applied to a 
variety of international and transnational laws, whether public or private,18
this commentary mostly ignores businesses’ interests in international law-
making.19
The focus on states’ interests in the choice between soft and hard inter-
national law is not surprising: for over one hundred years, conventional IL 
theory has asserted that international law is made wholly by states negotiat-
ing in their own national interests and that businesses influence states’ in-
ternational lawmaking efforts only indirectly through domestic channels.20
From this perspective, states may or may not incorporate these market inter-
ests made known to them through domestic channels; economic actors are 
viewed as helpless to press their case in international settings.
and TLO theory in our book, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS. See BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra
note 1, at 23–31.
17. Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Incrementalisms and Global Lawmaking,
32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 851, 854 n.9 (2007).
18. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 172 (2010) (“Language included in the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, the Basle Accord on Capital Adequacy, decisions of the 
UN Human Rights Committee, and rulings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), are 
thought to impact states because of their quasi-legal character.”); Shaffer & Pollack, supra
note 9, at 752–65, 790–98 (drawing examples from WTO trade law, international laws gov-
erning genetically modified food, finance, environmental protection of biodiversity, human 
rights, and trade in cultural products).
19. For counterexamples of commentary focused on business’ intervention in global 
lawmaking efforts, see, for example, BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1; JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 27 (2000); Durkee, supra 
note 2; Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63 (2013); Melissa J. Durkee, 
International Lobbying Law, 127 YALE L.J. 1742 (2018); Gregory C. Shaffer, How Business 
Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework, 42 CONN. L. REV. 147, 172 (2009). For counterex-
amples of commentary focused on businesses’ involvement in transnational private standard 
setting, see, for example, NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS (Anne Peters et al. 
eds. 2009).
20. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 341 (1905) (“Since the Law 
of Nations is a law between States only and exclusively, States only and exclusively are sub-
jects of the Law of Nations.”); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An 
Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 470–83 (2005) (surveying 
foundations of international legal theory, including the primacy of the state); Developments in 
the Law: Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1228 (2011) (tracing notion of the pri-
macy of nation-states in international lawmaking to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648). 
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Increasingly, however, this concentration on states as the only legiti-
mate influence in the making of law, whether domestic or international, has 
been criticized as “an outdated theory.”21 Recent scholarship has begun to 
question the primacy of nation-states and their national interests in the mak-
ing of international law.22 Some of this criticism is the result of empirical 
work demonstrating that the state-centric focus of conventional IL theory is 
either inaccurate or at least incomplete.23 These empirical studies find that 
businesses influence IL indirectly at the domestic level, to be sure, but also 
more directly by accessing international organizations (“IOs”) and transna-
tional regulatory networks (“TRNs”) both as observers and as participants in 
the lawmaking process.
In our book, Terence Halliday and I demonstrate broad involvement 
within the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) by delegations of non-state actors.24 Our observations in-
volve three case studies within UNCITRAL (insolvency, secured transac-
tions, and international transport law),25 but others have studied non-state 
influences across a broader range of international lawmaking.26 For exam-
ple, John Braithwaith and Peter Drahos study thirteen areas of global busi-
ness law and found that business actors invariably took leading roles in the 
formation of this law.27 Based on two additional case studies (the Cape 
Town Convention on securing international interests in mobile equipment, 
like aircraft and rolling stock, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free trade 
agreement), Melissa Durkee similarly contends that businesses “form trans-
national coalitions, address their concerns directly to international lawmak-
ers who are not subject to domestic political checks, and assume lawmaking 
roles previously held only by states.”28
21. Durkee, supra note 2, at 267.
22. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 19, at 27 (2000) (widely studying 
global business regulation and concluding, among other things, that “[t]he most recurrently 
effective actors in enrolling the power of states and the power of the most potent international 
organization (e.g. the WTO and IMF) are large US corporations.”); Durkee, supra note 2
(studying the role of business actors in treaty formation generally and in particular in the case 
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Cape Town Convention); Shaffer, supra note 19, at 172 
(concluding that “[b]usinesses play a critical role in international and transnational law, which 
has spread, directly or indirectly, to most regulatory areas.”).
23. Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal 
Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012).
24. BLOCK-LIEB & HALIDAY, supra note 1.
25. Id. at 4–7, 96–150.
26. Durkee, supra note 2, at 266.
27. BRAITHWAITE AND DRAHOS, supra note 19.
28. Durkee, supra note 2, at 268. Unlike Halliday and I, who focus both on 
UNCITRAL’s hard and soft international law products, Durkee concentrates her analysis on 
the business of treaties—that is, the involvement of business actors in treaty negotiations and 
the effect of this participation in the content and the success or failure of this hard law. Id. at 
287–88.
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These empirical studies stand on the shoulders of earlier theoretical 
commentary that questions the notion that states, and states alone, are and 
should be involved in international lawmaking. This modern theory looks to 
account for sub-state and possibly non-state actors’ involvement in the con-
ceptualization, drafting, implementation, and enforcement of international 
legislation. International liberal theory, for example, studies the role of sub-
national actors in international relations and international law.29 Network 
and global legal pluralism theories focus on the influences of sub-national 
epistemic communities in international lawmaking.30 The global administra-
tive law project argues that both public and private actors have roles in the 
administration of international law and looks to account for the involvement 
of these sub-national and non-state actors.31 Transnational legal order theory 
also examines the involvement of state, sub-state, and non-state actors but 
expands this focus to actors located in international, national, or local con-
texts and broadly considers the alignment, settling, and institutionalization 
of legal texts among these fields.32 Market theories of private standard set-
ting focus on non-state actors’ involvement in transnational self-regulation 
29. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 513 (1997) (elaborating liberal theory in interna-
tional relations; explaining that domestic constituencies construct state interests); Oona A. 
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1961 (2002) 
(through international liberal theory, considering the role of sub-state and non-state actors in 
developing and implementing human rights treaties because the theory “opens the black box 
of the state.”); Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV.
167, 168–70 (1999) (viewing sovereign nations as agents of small interest groups and, thus, 
questioning the Westphalian model of IL); Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of Interna-
tional Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 502 (2004) (arguing that domestic interest groups 
sometimes attempt to set domestic policy and develop domestic law through international 
agreement). 
30. For the classic work on network theory in international law (“IL”), see ANNE-
MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). For that of global legal pluralism, see 
PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND 
BORDERS (2012); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 
(2007). See also, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 
YALE L.J. 2599, 2603, 2656 (1997) (describing the influence of epistemic communities of 
government officials, NGOs, “transnational moral entrepreneurs[,]” and business entities 
working transnationally to entrench patterns of behavior and generate norms to solidify these 
patterns).
31. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,
68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 20 (2005) (discerning “[f]ive main types of globalized admin-
istrative regulation[,]” other than treaty laws, including some “administration by private insti-
tutions with regulatory functions.”).
32. See, e.g., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory 
Shaffer eds., 2015) (describing the aim of the transnational legal order theory as “reframing 
the study of law and society in today’s world from a predominantly national context . . . to a 
perspective that places processes of local, national, international, and transnational public and 
private lawmaking and practice in dynamic tension within a single analytic frame.”).
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and standard setting more than states’ involvement in international lawmak-
ing per se33 or international law more generally.34
Although conventional analyses of hard and soft international law fail 
to account for the distinct goals of soft international law in private, com-
mercial contexts, these commercial law contexts present an important locus 
of international law study.35 Specifically, emphasis on international com-
mercial law provides a basis for examining the role that business interests 
can and do play in producing and implementing hard and soft commercial 
laws and the special usefulness of soft international law to private, commer-
cial entities.
This Article proceeds to fill these gaps in three steps. Part I returns to 
the classic definition of hard international law initially put forward by Ken-
neth Abbott and Duncan Snidal and related IR scholars and analyzes exist-
ing commercial law treaties in light of this definition. It concludes that vir-
tually none of these commercial law treaties constitute “hard” international 
law because nearly all commercial law treaties rely on national courts for 
enforcement. But Abbott and Snidal’s focus on the extent to which interna-
tional law is legalized—and especially the extent to which it is enforced by 
international actors—may matter less with commercial than other more pub-
lic international lawmaking. This is because the mostly private law govern-
ing commercial transactions conceives of obligation and enforcement in 
ways distinct from its public law counterparts.
Part II explains the distinction between private and public laws that 
govern purely domestic commerce. Many commercial transactions are not 
governed by regulatory legislation imposing “top down” obligations en-
forced by the state but rather contractual obligations that are self-regulating 
33. See, e.g., NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS, supra note 19; KRISTINA 
TAMM HALLSTRÖM, ORGANIZING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION: ISO AND THE IASC
IN QUEST OF AUTHORITY (2004); Panagiotis Delimatsis, Global Standard-Setting 2.0: How 
the WTO Spotlights ISO and Impacts the Transnational Standard-Setting Process, 28 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 273 (2018); Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Setting International Standards: 
Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?, 56 WORLD POL. 1, 7 (2003).
34. See, e.g., Natasha Affolder, The Market for Treaties, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 159, 159 
(2010) (observing that business entities rely on treaties for their private interests); Durkee, 
supra note 2, at 316–18 (analyzing the regulation of corporate participation in treaty making 
through the lens of both an administrative and market theory); NON-STATE ACTORS AS 
STANDARD SETTERS, supra note 19, at xix (edited volume providing “broad insight into the 
multifaceted world of standard setting by non-state actors.”); Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing In-
ternational Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1577 (2011) (noting the increased role of private ac-
tors, including multinational corporations and other businesses, in international lawmaking 
and exploring the possible effects of such participation).
35. Others have written on the distinct role that soft international law plays in regulat-
ing global financial institutions and financial markets. See, e.g., CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW 
AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2d ed. 2015);
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SOFT LAW (Andrea K. Bjorklund & August Reinisch 
eds., 2012); THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE AND THE 
ROLE OF SOFT LAW (Friedl Weiss & Armin J. Kammel eds., 2015). On the distinction be-
tween commercial, financial, and other sorts of economic law, see supra note 1.
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and mostly self-enforcing. In the absence of mandatory commercial regula-
tion, businesses assert their interests domestically through privately orga-
nized contracts and litigation brought to enforce these contracts as well as 
through political pressure for reform of judicial administration. Where regu-
lation does exist or has been proposed, businesses may also look to influ-
ence this regulation by lobbying legislators and executives.
Part III considers the implications of commercial lawmaking for inter-
national settings and, in particular, state and non-state (that is, business) in-
terests in the production of international versions of such laws.36 State sov-
ereignty interests vary depending on the type of international commercial 
law reform proposed, whether regulatory or otherwise; business’ autonomy 
interests also vary along this axis. These interests may diverge,37 although 
the interests of states and businesses are also interconnected and subject to 
change based on assertions of influence.38 Soft law may aid in bridging 
these differences in various ways—through its gap-filling, advocacy, and 
socializing functions. Businesses are uniquely capable of fulfilling these 
functions through soft international law, capabilities that Part III explores 
both with reference to the detail of various international commercial laws 
and with regard to broader theoretical concerns.
I.  International Commercial Laws and Their “Legalization”
Abbott and Snidal view only precise obligations subject to enforcement 
by an international court or other binding dispute resolution mechanism as 
sufficiently legalized to qualify as hard international law. Hardly any inter-
national agreements on topics of commercial law would satisfy Abbott and 
Snidal’s test for hard law, specifically the aspect of their test regarding del-
egation and objectively certain enforcement of international treaties.39 This 
36. Soft law commentators mostly consider the role of soft international law in mitigat-
ing conflicts between states and thus as complementing or supplementing hard international 
laws. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Reviewing the Use of “Soft Law” in Investment Arbitration,
7.2 EURO. INT’L ARB. REV 149 (2018); Guzman & Meyer, supra note 18; Guzman, Design,
supra note 11; Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9. Shaffer and Pollack have also written exten-
sively on the potential for hard and soft international laws to interact as antagonists. See Shaf-
fer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 743–52, and 788–98. When Shaffer and Pollack view this an-
tagonism as between actors, they mostly talk in terms of states’ interests diverging. But see
Shaffer, supra note 19. In this Article, I too hold out the possibility that states hold divergent 
interests from business and other private participants in international lawmaking. 
37. For a discussion of hard and soft law as antagonists, see Shaffer and Pollack, supra
note 9, at 765–84, 788–98.
38. See id. at 722–27 (noting that soft law commentators focus more on the ways in 
which hard and soft law interact as complements).
39. As noted above, Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal distinguish among harder or 
softer international instruments on the grounds of their “legalization”—that is, (i) the preci-
sion of the rules; (ii) the obligation they create for implementing states; and (iii) whether the 
rules delegate resolution of disputes arising under their terms to a third-party decisionmaker or 
enforcement agent. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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is not because there is a dearth of commercial law treaties to have entered 
into force, however.
There are numerous longstanding private law treaties governing a wide 
range of procedural topics. The New York Convention (1958),40 which gov-
erns enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, is a multilateral treaty that en-
joys nearly unparalleled ratification by countries around the globe. The 
Hague Conference on Private International Law promulgated a number of 
treaties on topics that range from service of process, evidence, enforcement 
of choice of court clauses, and so on.41 In addition to this international 
commercial law governing procedural topics, there are more than a handful 
of treaties governing the substance of specific commercial transactions, such 
as the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
relating to Bills of Lading, commonly referred to as the Hague Rules 
(1924),42 the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, also known as the CISG (1978),43 and the Convention on In-
40. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
7, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
41. The Hague Conference on Private International Law (sometimes referred to as 
“HCCH”) describes itself as “The World Organisation for Cross-Border Co-operation in Civil 
and Commercial Matters.” See HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., https://www.hcch.net/
en/home (last visited Apr. 8, 2019). Perusal of the international instruments it has promulgat-
ed over the past century clarifies that the term “matters” refers to litigation between private 
parties and that its core mission involves coordination of the procedural rules followed in such 
litigation. For a list of these instruments, see Conventions, Protocols and Principles, HAGUE 
CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions (last visited Apr. 
8, 2019). 
42. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to 
Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Hague Rules]. Nearly one hun-
dred years have passed since the Hague Rules entered into force, and enormous changes in the 
shipping industry have rendered many of its provisions outdated. See BLOCK-LIEB &
HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 99–100. As a result, states have sought to revise it, but treaty revi-
sion is exceedingly difficult with a treaty that has been agreed to as broadly as the Hague 
Rules have. The most successful of these revisions, the Visby Protocols, have been ratified by 
dozens of nations. For a discussion of the Visby Protocols, see BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, 
supra note 1, at 99–107. But dissension is widespread, especially among less economically
developed nations. UNCITRAL sought to redress states’ concerns with the Hague Rules’ lack 
of modernity and carrier focus with its production of the Hamburg Rules in the late 1970s, and 
several states’ ratification of this draft treaty means that these too have entered into force. 
BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 100. Technical advances in the shipping industry 
and shifts in the economics of shipping prompted subsequent pressure for modernization of 
the Hague-Visby Rules with a new draft convention on international transport. BLOCK-LIEB &
HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 102–04. UNCITRAL recently promulgated its United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, 
Dec. 11, 2008, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/transport/rotterdam_rules/Rotterdam-
Rules-E.pdf [hereinafter Rotterdam Rules]. Although roughly 20 countries signed this con-
vention, only three ratified it. As a result, the Rotterdam Rules have not (yet?) entered into 
force. For a discussion of the Rotterdam Rules, see BLOCK-LIEB AND HALLIDAY, supra note 
1, at 236–41.
43. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 
11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. 
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ternational Interest in Mobile Equipment, known as the Cape Town Con-
vention (2000).44
All of these conventions, whether procedural or substantive, rely on na-
tional courts for their enforcement.45 Without international provision for 
their enforcement, these conventions would not be sufficiently legalized to 
be considered hard law under the definition set out by Abbot and Snidal.
Moreover, the CISG widely permits private parties otherwise subject to its 
terms to simply decide that they do not like its provisions and thus opt out 
by saying as much in their contracts. This kind of opt-out provision, some-
times also referred to as a default rule, while ordinary in some domestic law 
contexts, is unusual in international law and is highly controversial in some 
academic circles.46 A convention that can be avoided through a contractual 
opt-out would hardly seem an “obligation” in the sense put forward by Ab-
bott and Snidal. Moreover, nearly all of these treaties govern contractual re-
lationships of one kind or another. As a result, the obligations that they im-
pose are conditional on the conclusion of some initial private agreement.
International commercial law consists of more than just these “nearly 
hard” multilateral conventions. International organizations (“IOs”) have also 
widely promulgated non-binding legal texts concerning commercial and fi-
nancial markets, mostly in the form of precisely drafted model laws or mod-
el legal provisions but also sometimes in the form of broad statements of 
principle offered to guide future legislation or regulation on a topic. States 
have implemented some of this soft international commercial law, for ex-
ample, by enacting domestic legislation based on these international models 
or inspired by these principles.47 Examples of this soft international law 
demonstrate the breadth of this range of commercial topics.
In our recent book, Global Lawmakers, Terence Halliday and I found 
that UNCITRAL has relied on soft law instruments since its inception in is-
sue areas as varied as commercial dispute resolution, e-commerce, pro-
44. Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, 
T.I.A.S. No. 06-301.2, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter Cape Town Convention]. 
45. See, e.g., Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, supra note 19. The Cape Town Convention 
(“CTC”) creates an international registry for international interests in mobile equipment, how-
ever. By internationalizing implementation of its mandatory rules and setting up this interna-
tional registry, the Cape Town Convention may limit the grounds on which national courts 
can undermine enforcement of its mandates.
46. See generally Gilles Cuniberti, Is the CISG Benefiting Anybody?, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1511 (2006); Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of 
International Sales Law, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 446 (2005); Paul B. Stephan, The Futility 
of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743 
(1999). The CISG is not unique in this regard. For example, the draft Rotterdam Rules would 
allow parties to enter into “volume contracts” that would not, based on such an agreement, 
otherwise be subjected to specified mandatory provisions in this draft convention once it en-
ters into force. Rotterdam Rules, supra note 42, art. 80. 
47. For collections of essays on these topics, see, for example, INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND SOFT LAW, supra note 35; THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF SOFT LAW, supra note 35.
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curement, project finance, insolvency, and secured transactions law.48 We
also found that, over its fifty-year history, UNCITRAL “invented” and 
adopted many types of soft law when drafting international standards, in-
cluding: rules; model laws and model legal provisions; model contract pro-
visions; recommendations; legal guides; notes; legislative guides; practice 
guides; and reports.49
UNCITRAL is not unique in its reliance on soft international law on 
commercial and financial topics.50 Although the International Institute for 
the Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) promulgated only draft con-
ventions between its re-emergence after World War II and the 1990s, it has 
increasingly relied on soft law formats such as model laws and principles.51
The Hague Conference on Private International Law, which, until recently, 
worked exclusively on producing draft conventions and protocols, also 
promulgated a set of Principles on Choice of Law in International Commer-
cial Contracts in 2015.52 The United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment (“UNCTAD”) and other IOs that focus on reforming sovereign 
debt lending and restructuring practices have similarly published principles 
on responsible sovereign lending and borrowing,53 although, in the past, 
UNCTAD legislative projects mostly centered on producing draft conven-
tions.54 The G-20, and the numerous lawmaking IOs and TRNs it relies on 
to build out its financial architecture project, have endorsed principles on a 
wide range of financial and economic issues.55 Indeed, some commentators 
48. BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 65–82.
49. BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 80–82.
50. See BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 80; Susan Block-Lieb & Terence 
Halliday, Contracts and Private Law in the Emerging Ecology of International Lawmaking, in
CONTRACTUAL KNOWLEDGE: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL EXPERIMENTATION IN 
GLOBAL MARKETS 350 (Grégoire Mallard & Jérôme Sgard eds., 2016) [hereinafter Block-
Lieb & Halliday, Emerging Ecology].
51. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, Emerging Ecology, supra note 50, at 352.
52. Block-Lieb & Halliday, Emerging Ecology, supra note 50, at 383.
53. ANNA GELPERN, HARD, SOFT, AND EMBEDDED: IMPLEMENTING PRINCIPLES ON 
PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING (2012), https://unctad.org/
en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2012misc2_en.pdf (written for United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”)); MATTHIAS GOLDMANN, RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN 
LENDING AND BORROWING: THE VIEW FROM DOMESTIC JURISDICTIONS (2012), 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2012misc3_en.pdf (a comparative survey 
written for UNCTAD); Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Matthias Goldmann, An Incremental Ap-
proach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Sovereign Debt Sustainability as a Principle of Pub-
lic International Law, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 13, 23–26 (2016).
54. BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 377–80.
55. For a discussion of the G-20’s high-level principles on financial consumer protec-
tion, financial inclusion, financial education, and other topics, see Susan Block-Lieb, Con-
sumer Financial Protection, Inclusion, and Education: Connecting the Local to the Global, in
LAW BETWEEN BUILDINGS: EMERGING GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES IN URBAN LAW 82 (Nestor 
Davidson &Nisha Mistry eds., 2017). For a discussion of other aspects of the G-20’s financial 
architecture project, see, for example, BRUMMER, supra note 35; Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. 
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promote soft international law as preferable to hard law for addressing prob-
lems in international regulation of financial institutions and financial mar-
kets despite—and possibly because of—the fact that it is not enforceable.56
That little international commercial law satisfies the test for legalization 
set out by Abbott and Snidal is hardly surprising. Domestic private laws, 
like many governing commercial transactions, are implemented and en-
forced differently than their domestic public law counterparts. While public 
laws set mandatory obligations, private laws may condition obligation on 
voluntary agreement of one sort or another. While mandatory public laws 
are mostly enforced by states, private laws are often self-enforcing, albeit 
with the assistance of state-sponsored courts.
None of this should be understood as an argument to disregard Abbott 
and Snidal and their focus on precisely stated, independently enforceable 
obligations when assessing international commercial law. But emphasizing 
and examining the distinctions between hard and soft international commer-
cial laws assist in understanding that the role of open-ended, non-binding 
texts may hold distinct implications for commercial contexts, and particular-
ly for the business actors to which they apply. These distinctions hold sov-
ereignty and autonomy implications for the participants in national and 
transnational commercial lawmaking and for the implementation and en-
forcement of these laws once promulgated, as more fully discussed in the 
next two parts.
II.  A Typology of Domestic Law Governing 
Commercial Conduct
There are three distinct “models” of national laws governing the com-
mercial conduct of private parties.57 To keep them separate, I will refer to 
one as commercial regulation, another as commercial common law, and the 
third as a commercial code.
Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A Case of the G-20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 491 (2012); Martin Gelter & Zehra G. Kavame Eroglu, Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynam-
ics of Resistance Against IFRS, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 89, 102–03 (2014). So far, clubs of na-
tions like the G-20 and G-7 have produced “leaders’ declarations,” which endorse “high level 
principles” but nothing “harder.”
56. See BRUMMER, supra note 35, ch. 3 (exploring why “most agreements, rules and 
standards used for promulgation of international financial law [are] non-binding” but entered 
into solemnly and complied with by means of reputation sanctions, market discipline, and in-
stitutional disciplines and how the “dominant explanations” of “soft law effectiveness” fall 
short in explaining global financial markets).
57. The reference here to national commercial laws is meant only to distinguish be-
tween national and transnational versions of these laws and not to discount the importance of 
sub-national or local laws, such as state law in the United States. Moreover, while it may be 
possible to apply a similar typology to any sort of private law, not just that governing com-
mercial conduct of private parties, I leave questions of the generalizability of this analysis for 
another time. 
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With commercial regulation, a government establishes obligations or 
restrictions on the commercial behavior of private actors through legislation. 
Commercial regulation involves mandates. It is mandatory because gov-
ernments often direct regulation at conduct they look to change (either by 
limiting or prohibiting it).58 These mandates constrain private parties’ free-
dom to contract. Because regulation looks to alter behavior, strong govern-
mental enforcement may be viewed as a necessary component to the regula-
tory scheme. Regulatory obligations are subject to enforcement (i) by 
government action,59 (ii) by private action through government institutions, 
such as government-sponsored courts,60 or (iii) through some combination 
of private and public action. Banking laws and regulations, for example, are 
enforced solely through public action;61 insolvency and intellectual property 
laws set mandatory rules but are enforced mostly through private action;62
the Sherman Antitrust Act and False Claims Act authorize both government 
and private enforcement of their mandates, although they especially incen-
tivize qui tam and other private actions with the promise of treble damages 
if private law suits are successful.63
58. There may be constitutional as well as purely political limitations on the breadth of 
conduct that the government can regulate.
59. Government enforcement varies in terms of the extent to which government actors 
possess and exercise jurisdiction to determine private actors’ compliance with the mandates 
contained in regulation: more than simply require or prohibit conduct, regulation may specify 
how a regulated entity should comply with regulatory requirements. For example, govern-
ments may enforce regulatory mandates with threat of criminal or civil action, such as with 
securities regulations. They may assert visitorial jurisdiction that claims complete access to 
the books and records of regulated entities, such as with bank regulations.
60. For a discussion of regulation enforced through private action, see, for example, 
Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637 (2013); J. 
Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012).
61. For a discussion of regulation enforced through a combination of public and private 
enforcement, see Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institu-
tional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18 (2010); Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private 
Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 285 (2016); Prentiss Cox et al., Strategies of Public UDAP 
Enforcement, 55 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 37 (2018); Dee Pridgen, The Dynamic Duo of Consumer 
Protection: State and Private Enforcement of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Laws, 81 
ANTITRUST L.J. 911 (2017); see also Zachary D. Clopton, Diagonal Public Enforcement, 70 
STAN. L. REV. 1077 (2018).
62. Bankruptcy and insolvency laws often either require or allow for the appointment 
of a trustee in bankruptcy (“TIB”). The TIB should be viewed as a quasi-public official and 
litigation brought by the trustee as a hybrid between public/private action. Melissa B. Jacoby, 
Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1715 (2018). Intellectual property (“IP”)
laws usually either require or allow private parties to register these property interests in gov-
ernment sponsored registries. But ex post violations of IP laws are enforced (mostly) through 
private causes of action brought before government-sponsored courts, unless criminal viola-
tions of the law are asserted. John M. Golden, Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement’s His-
torical Survivors, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545 (2013).
63. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: 
Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 107 
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Government involvement with commercial common law is more attenu-
ated and indirect than with commercial regulation. With commercial com-
mon law, private parties are mostly free to contract about their commercial 
interactions. Breach of these privately established obligations is subject to 
enforcement through (but not by) government institutions. Government-
sponsored courts may be engaged in dispute resolution through their super-
vision of litigation (with the court’s rationale in deciding a dispute recorded 
in publicly available decisions that can guide the future action of private 
parties) or by enforcing awards entered in privately conducted arbitration 
proceedings (although the decisions of an arbitrator are often not made pub-
licly available and so are less likely to guide future conduct). In either case, 
however, these enforcement actions are initiated by private actors at private 
expense. Unlike regulation, which may trigger a wide range of public en-
forcement action by government actors—whether government regulators, 
investigators, or prosecutors—common law violations are self-enforcing 
through private action or not at all. I refer to this as commercial common 
law because, in common law countries, the decisions issued by courts to re-
solve private parties’ disputes are, or at least act as, law. Arbitral decisions 
and privately negotiated contracts and other texts may similarly provide or-
der for public parties, although these texts are not issued by governmental 
actors and may not be publicly available for review or guidance.
Commercial codes offer a third alternative. Commercial conduct is gov-
erned by a commercial or other code in civil law jurisdictions, but the term 
is used broadly here to also include statutes such as the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, adopted in all fifty of the United States. As with commercial 
common law, private parties are mostly free to identify their own re-
strictions and set their own obligations in some private document, such as a 
contract, and states offer courts as a means for dispute resolution, whether 
directly through litigation or indirectly through enforcement of arbitral 
awards. Distinct from common law development, courts resolve contract 
disputes governed by commercial codes by following the logic set out in the 
code rather than that set out in earlier judicial decisions. Courts’ reasoning 
may be made publicly available, but, depending on the jurisdiction, these 
published judicial decisions may have limited precedential effect; private 
parties may not be able to rely on these judicial decisions to guide their con-
duct and contracting. Instead, governments draft commercial legislation in 
codes to guide private parties in contracting and conducting their commer-
cial affairs.
N.W. U. L. REV. 1689 (2013); David Kwok, Evidence from the False Claims Act: Does Pri-
vate Enforcement Attract Excessive Litigation?, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 225 (2013) (assessing 
public and private enforcement of FCA); Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative 
Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws,
2011 BYU L. REV. 315 (2011) (discussing the relative merits of public and private enforce-
ment of antitrust laws); D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in 
Antitrust as Business Strategy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 689 (2012). 
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Commercial codes may resemble regulation (as defined above) in that 
both are creatures of legislation. Nonetheless, unlike regulation, a code gen-
erally does not seek to alter private conduct. Instead, codes often aim merely 
to record conduct and custom and set out their findings in law-like form for 
all to access.64 Neither commercial codes nor commercial common laws in-
volve mandates in the same way that regulation does. Private parties are 
governed by codes or common laws because they opt in to this law through 
voluntary agreement and, depending on how these agreements are drafted, 
may opt out of default provisions in the law. In this way, it is often said that 
common law courts and codes both “find” rather than “make” law.
Figure 1: Varieties of Commercial Laws, and Their Implications 
for Sovereignty and Private Party Autonomy
Domestic Law
Commercial 
Common 
Law
? Private parties (PPs) set obligations, e.g., through contract
? Private obligations self-enforced by PPs, through government-sponsored, 
domestic courts
o Litigation ? entry of judgment + enforcement of judgment; OR
o Enforcement of arbitral award
? “Common law” created by judicial decision published ex post; courts 
“find” law by examining past practices and past precedent
Commercial 
Code
? State, through legislature, sets out PPs’ obligations in a code
o Legislatures “find” law through examining past practices
? Private obligations self-enforced by PPs, through assistance of govt-
sponsored, domestic courts
o Litigation ? entry of judgment + enforcement of judgment; OR
o Enforcement of arbitral award
? Code exists ex ante; PPs trigger these obligations through private 
arrangement, e.g., contract
o PPs may opt out of code provisions through contract
Commercial 
Regulation
? State, through legislature, sets out PPs’ obligations in regulation
o Regulations often set mandatory rules (no opt-out)
o Legislatures “make” regulatory law
? State, through executive, may implement and enforce regulation
o Compliance
o Public litigation ? entry of judgment + enforcement of judgment; 
OR
o Enforcement of arbitral award (if arbitral)
? State may delegate some or all enforcement authority to PPs
o Private litigation ? entry of judgment + enforcement of judgment; 
OR
o Enforcement of arbitral award (if arbitral)
64. In this way, commercial codes are often referred to as a “modern” lex mercatoria.
See, e.g., Gilles Cuniberti, Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
369 (2014); CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, The Unification of the Law of International Trade
(1968), in SELECT ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 206 (Chia-Jui Cheng ed., 1988).
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Figure 1 summarizes this typology. It shows that government involve-
ment in commercial common law is minimal, while government involve-
ment in commercial regulation is substantial; government involvement in 
commercial codes sits between these two. States rely on courts simultane-
ously to enforce and create commercial common law. With commercial 
codes, states rely on legislatures to draft the codes and courts to enforce
them. With regulation, states rely on legislatures to draft, executive agents 
to implement, and courts to enforce the regulations.
Figure 1 also informs understanding of businesses’ influence on com-
mercial law and legal ordering in a domestic context. Influence is generally 
described as the pressure that businesses exert on legislatures, regulators, 
and state executives. Where a commercial code or regulation exists or has 
been proposed at the national level, businesses may seek to affect the pres-
ence and content of the legislation and its enforcement through lobbying ef-
forts. Lobbying is far less important with commercial common law, howev-
er, since, by definition, no legislation governs this law. The common law
nonetheless presents alternative avenues for influencing its direction and the 
legal ordering of commerce. Here, businesses primarily assert their interests 
through privately organized contracts and litigation brought to enforce these 
contracts. If they are generally dissatisfied with the court system, they may 
also exert political pressure for reform of the rules governing procedure or 
judicial administration and possibly even of judges or juridical institutions. 
If dissatisfied with the substance of specific judicial rulings in a particular 
issue area, businesses may even push for legislation to overwrite the case 
law.
In sum, this Part distinguished between three types of domestic com-
mercial law—commercial common laws, commercial codes, and commer-
cial regulation—to clarify that, considered as a whole, commercial law in-
volves both private and public interests. Part III, next, complicates this 
analysis to consider international commercial law. Unlike conventional in-
ternational law analysis, which focuses on legal texts negotiated between 
states to regulate the (public) obligations sovereign states owe to each other, 
analysis of international commercial law requires consideration of both pub-
lic and private obligations—that is, sovereign states’ obligations owed as a 
result of an international treaty and the implications that states’ obligations 
hold for commercial actors’ obligations to each other, including their con-
tracts and litigation choices.
III.  International Implications: Distinguishing Sovereignty 
and Autonomy Effects of International Commercial Laws
How do state and business interests interact in the production of inter-
national commercial law? Under what circumstances are states’ sovereignty 
interests and business’ autonomy interests consistent, and when do they di-
verge? How does this interaction of interests affect businesses that look to 
influence international commercial lawmaking, not just through domestic 
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channels but also in an international setting? And how has this interaction 
affected the choice between hard and soft law governing international com-
mercial markets? Each of these questions is analyzed below.
As noted in Part II, there are three distinct “models” of national laws 
governing the commercial conduct of private parties: commercial common 
law, commercial codes, and commercial regulation. The same sovereignty 
and autonomy interests identified through this typology of domestic com-
mercial laws assist in differentiating among the broad array of international 
commercial laws—some procedural, some substantive; some that are nearly 
hard, much that is very soft. The sections below first generally describe the 
sovereignty and autonomy interests involved in the making of international 
commercial laws. Sovereignty and autonomy interests vary with the type of 
commercial law involved, but there may be more issue-specific national and 
market interests at stake. Together these interests are applied to the list of 
international commercial laws set out in Part I.
A. International Commercial Law and Its Implications for 
Sovereignty and Autonomy
Part I identified two broad types of international commercial law trea-
ties: procedural and substantive. Since the latter decades of the nineteenth 
century, jurists have viewed multilateral conventions on matters of proce-
dure to be the most promising avenue for international agreement governing 
commercial transactions on the grounds that they were “apolitical,” or at 
least removed from the politics of substance.65 Consistent with this expecta-
tion, more than several procedural treaties have entered into force, including 
the New York Convention on the enforcement of arbitral awards.66 Like 
domestic commercial common laws, procedural treaties minimally affect 
states’ sovereignty interests. They bind domestic courts in specified ways 
but may not otherwise constrain states. Procedural treaties also lightly touch 
private, commercial parties’ autonomy interests. They limit some litigation 
practices but strengthen others by enabling the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments; the substance of commercial rights and obligations is 
otherwise untouched by procedural treaties.
The existence of hard, or mostly-hard, procedural international law is, 
thus, explained to a large extent by an analysis of its limited intrusions on 
the sovereignty interests of states and the autonomy interests of private, 
65. See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private In-
ternational Law and the Challenge from Europeanization and Globalization, in AKTUELLE 
FRAGEN ZU POLITISCHER UND RECHTLICHER STEUERUNG IM KONTEXT DER 
GLOBALISIERUNG 119, 124 n.21 (Michael Stolleis & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 2007), 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2812 (describing the “private interna-
tional law” analysis of Story and Savigny as intentionally “apolitical,”); Daniela Caruso, Pri-
vate Law And State-Making in the Age of Globalization, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 20 
(2007) (same).
66. See New York Convention, supra note 40.
450 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:433
commercial actors. Treaties governing the enforcement of awards or judg-
ments and other procedural matters encroach only, or at least mostly, on the 
judicial authority within a nation state. As a result, they intrude less on the 
sovereignty of ratifying countries than treaties governing substantive areas 
of law. Treaties on the recognition and enforcement of judgments also im-
pinge lightly on the autonomy of the commercial actors located in these 
countries, especially where the treaty enforces choice of court and choice of 
law provisions in parties’ contracts. International laws governing the en-
forceability of international arbitral awards are even less intrusive on sover-
eignty and autonomy interests given that treaties on arbitral enforcement are 
limited to a single, procedural issue and that the private parties whose dis-
putes are governed by such treaties contractually agreed to arbitrate in the 
first place. Both sorts of international procedural laws mirror the logic of 
domestic commercial common law in that both sorts of commercial laws 
focus on the enforcement of the contracts between private, commercial ac-
tors.
And yet, broad agreement on a multilateral convention governing the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments has evaded international agree-
ment, despite international consensus on the enforceability of arbitral 
awards. There is also a substantial body of soft international law on the pro-
cedures to be followed in litigating commercial claims before domestic 
courts and in international arbitration proceedings. The details of this hard 
and soft international law are discussed below with an eye to explaining the 
relative absence of hard law on the recognition of foreign judgments and 
presence of soft international laws on topics of commercial procedure.
There are also several treaties on topics of commercial law that extend 
beyond procedure and reach to substance. Two of these substantive com-
mercial treaties govern topics that, under national law, would count as 
common law or a commercial code because they govern contracts of one 
form or another.67 Another of these treaties is both regulatory and “code-
like” in that private parties must first opt in to the contracts governing these 
international interests before its mandatory rules apply.68
Once parties opt in to these international laws through contract, each of 
these substantive treaties constrains commercial actors’ freedom to contract 
in specified ways, but these constraints are, in turn, limited. Only the inter-
national commercial transaction specified in the convention is implicated; 
purely domestic transactions continue to be governed by the relevant do-
67. These include contracts for the international sale of goods in the case of the CISG 
and contracts for the carriage of goods by sea in the case of the Hague-Visby Rules. Hague 
Rules, supra note 42; CISG, supra note 43.
68. Cape Town Convention, supra note 44. The Cape Town Convention is also at least
“conditionally regulatory” in that the international interests it governs are valid and effective 
against non-parties to the contract on the basis of satisfying the registration requirements set 
out in the treaty and one of the appended protocols. See, e.g., Roy Goode, Private Commercial 
Law Conventions and Public and Private International Law: The Radical Approach of the 
Cape Town Convention 2001 and Its Protocols, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 523 (2016). 
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mestic law. In addition, contracting parties may opt out of one of these con-
ventions—the CISG—through the simple expedient of choosing some other 
applicable law.69
Because these substantive treaties are triggered by, and potentially lim-
ited by, private contracts, most of the obligations under them are borne by 
private parties. States’ obligations under these substantive commercial law 
treaties are relatively limited: Domestic courts are obligated not to enter 
judgments inconsistent with the rules set out in the treaty once it is satisfied 
the treaty governs the transaction. Further, domestic legislatures are obligat-
ed not to produce laws inconsistent with the treaty provisions. Like other 
types of contracts, the contracts subject to these substantive commercial law 
treaties are self-enforcing.
The typology spelled out in Part II, above, assists in understanding why 
global lawmakers succeeded in promulgating these nearly-hard, code-like 
conventions, but—as with the explanation of international lawmaking on 
procedural matters—does not tell the full story. There is also a growing 
body of soft international law governing international contracts, including 
international contracts for the sale of goods, which gets detailed below. The 
purpose of this supplementary soft law on international contracts is similar 
to the soft international law on topics of commercial arbitration and concili-
ation—one complements the other by providing a gap-filling function.70
Finally, international commercial law implicating national commercial 
regulation would create maximal imposition on state sovereignty. This is 
because a “regulatory” treaty would constrain three distinct aspects of sov-
ereignty: a state’s judiciary would be obligated to decide enforcement ac-
tions brought before it, whether by public or private parties, consistent with 
the rules set out in the treaty; its legislature could not enact legislation in-
consistent with the treaty provisions; and its executive would be required to 
enforce treaty obligations in the same way as with obligations under domes-
tic commercial regulation.
Not surprisingly, the only international commercial legislation that ap-
proaches a regulatory topic is insolvency law and possibly intellectual prop-
erty law, depending upon the breadth of the definition of commercial law. If 
we expand the circle slightly to include both international commercial and 
financial laws and open up the possibility for consideration of regulations 
governing securities, capital markets, and financial institutions, we find ad-
ditional international texts—but few if any international or multilateral con-
ventions. On these topics, global lawmakers have produced hard interna-
69. CISG, supra note 43, art. 6.
70. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Pathways to International Cooper-
ation, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 51–53 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004) (analyzing 
three “pathways to cooperation” through the interaction of hard and soft international law); 
Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 722–27, 733 (analyzing the range of IL and IR scholarship 
that views hard and soft international law as “complements”).
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tional law only on the regulation of intellectual property with the TRIPS 
convention.71 International insolvency law72 and the international law gov-
erning banking, securities, and other financial regulatory topics are all for-
mulated as soft law.73
The lack of hard, or nearly-hard, international legislation on these regu-
latory topics is, thus, mostly explained by the breadth of the intrusions on 
the sovereignty of any country bound to such a mandate. Hard international 
law governing banking regulation or the regulation of capital markets would 
tread on all three “sovereign toes” in that domestic versions of these types 
of laws involve national legislation enforced by national regulators or other 
executives through national courts. Hard international law governing intel-
lectual property or insolvency laws would not tread on national executives’ 
interests in regulatory enforcement to the same extent since these laws are 
mostly self-enforced by the private parties, but it would tread, in some way, 
on all three branches of national government. In addition, depending on how 
they are drafted, international commercial laws implicating national com-
mercial regulations may constrain private parties’ freedom to contract, alt-
hough these autonomous interests may already be severely limited by the 
governing domestic regulation. Moreover, because commercial regulation 
mostly sets mandates, private parties may not be able to opt out—regardless 
of whether such regulations impose international or national obligations.
A focus on the sovereignty and autonomy interests at risk with interna-
tional commercial regulation may explain the absence of hard international 
laws on these regulated issue areas, but what explains the presence of soft 
international laws in substantive areas on which domestic regulation is 
commonplace, such as insolvency law or the regulation of financial institu-
tions and financial and capital markets? Existing commentary posits com-
plementary or antagonistic roles for soft laws layered with hard laws,74 but 
these analyses do not explain stand-alone soft laws that neither bolster nor 
compete with pre-existing hard international law. This earlier commentary 
also focuses nearly exclusively on states’ interests, but our focus on interna-
tional commercial law forces consideration of the interests of sub-national 
actors (such as regulators) and non-state actors (such as the businesses and 
transactions to which the soft law texts are directed). Puzzles remain regard-
71. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
72. UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 
(2005); UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW: PART THREE: TREATMENT 
OF ENTERPRISE GROUPS IN INSOLVENCY, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2012); UNCITRAL
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW: PART FOUR: DIRECTORS’ OBLIGATIONS IN THE 
PERIOD APPROACHING INSOLVENCY, U.N. Sales No. E.13.V.10 (2013). 
73. See, e.g., supra note 55 (discussing the predominance of soft international law in 
this context).
74. See, e.g., Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 722–27, 788–98.
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ing the extent of reliance on soft international law in these commercial con-
texts and the possible influence of business actors in this decisionmaking.
B. Digging into the Details
The next sections dig more deeply into the details of international 
commercial lawmaking, both in terms of business access to international 
arenas of lawmaking and to the implications of such access for the choice 
between hard and soft international commercial law. They first discuss in-
ternational commercial laws governing procedural topics (enforcement of 
arbitration awards; enforcement of judgments; enforcement of choice of 
court and choice of law clauses) and then proceed to substantive commer-
cial code treaties (international sale of goods; international transport; inter-
national interests in moveable equipment) and international commercial 
regulation (insolvency and financial markets).
1. Arbitration and Dispute Resolution
The New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards was first signed in 1958, quickly entered into effect in 
1959, and currently enjoys ratification by an impressive 159 countries.75 The 
scope of the New York Convention is fairly limited.76 It governs only the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. It does not govern 
the conduct of arbitration proceedings,77 nor does it reach the recognition or 
enforcement of settlements arising out of other dispute mechanisms, such as 
conciliation or mediation.78 Although the New York Convention is not ex-
75. New York Convention, supra note 40. For a list of the countries acceding to the 
terms of the New York Convention, see Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&lang=en (last visited Mar. 20, 2019). 
76. Although there are about 15 articles in the convention, the bulk of its mandates are 
found in article III. It provides that “each Contracting State shall recognize [transnational or 
international] arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of pro-
cedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, . . . .” New York Convention, supra 
note 40, art. III; see also id. art. I (defining the scope of the treaty as applying to “arbitral 
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and en-
forcement of such awards are sought,”); id. art. V (specifying several exceptions to such 
recognition and enforcement).
77. See New York Convention, supra note 40, art. V, ¶ 1(a)–(e). But see UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/
en/texts/arbitration/contractualtexts/arbitration (last visited Mar. 24, 2019); UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with Amendments Adopted (2006),
U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/
commercial_arbitration (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
78. But see United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Result-
ing from Mediation, to be opened for signature Aug. 7, 2019, U.N. Doc. A/73/17, annex I; 
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (1980), U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L.,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/contractualtexts/conciliation (last visited Mar. 24, 
2019); UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and International Set-
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pressly limited to the recognition of commercial arbitration awards, its pri-
mary purpose is historically viewed as the promotion of international trade 
and commercial transactions.79
The 159 countries that are bound by the New York Convention, thus, 
have agreed to relatively small limitations on their sovereignty. Although 
the Convention refers to the obligations of “each Contracting State,” these 
obligations are centered on the courts of the Contracting States. The Con-
vention imposes strong obligations on domestic courts to enforce and rec-
ognize transnational or international arbitral awards within its scope. But it 
does not limit domestic courts’ enforcement of domestic arbitral awards; nor 
does it limit the authority of domestic legislatures or other rulemaking bod-
ies with jurisdiction over the enforcement of domestic arbitral awards. As 
such, the New York Convention steps on only one “toe” of a state’s sover-
eignty.
This limited encroachment on sovereignty accounts both for the will-
ingness of so many states to accede to the international obligations set out in 
the Convention and for its biggest weakness. Criticism of the New York 
Convention mostly centers on complaints about national courts in countries 
bound to the New York Convention that purport to follow the convention 
but decline to enforce an arbitral award on grounds viewed as indefensible, 
mostly overbroad interpretations of the “public policy” exception to en-
forcement found in the Convention.80 Since there is no international court 
with jurisdiction to review the “erroneous” decisions of “rogue” national 
courts, there is little that can be done about national courts’ overly broad 
readings of the Convention’s exceptions.81 This slippage is precisely the 
concern raised by Abbott and Snidal—unless international legislation is en-
forceable by an international court or dispute mechanism, its “obligations” 
may be undermined by national actors and enabled by national courts.
tlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, 2018, U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial_conciliation (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2019).
79. See, e.g., Allen Sultan, The United Nations Arbitration Convention and United 
States Policy, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 807, 824 (1959) (reviewing the history of the preparation of 
the New York Convention and arguing that the United States should ratify it on the grounds 
that “the goals of international commercial arbitration do not vary from the general objectives 
of society—prosperity, security, human freedom, and justice.”).
80. See, e.g., Leon Trakman, Domestic Courts Declining to Recognize and Enforce 
Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Comparative Reflection, 6 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 174 (2018) (de-
scribing court decisions from the United States, China, and the Netherlands discussing the 
breadth of the “public policy exception” in the New York Convention).
81. Soft law provides some measure of redress, although an obviously unenforceable 
one. For an example of this sort of effort at moral suasion, see Recommendation Regarding 
the Interpretation of Article II, Paragraph 2, and Article VII, Paragraph 1, of the Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Done in New York, 10 June 
1958 (2006), U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/
arbitration/explanatorytexts/recommendations/foreign_arbitral_awards (last visited Mar. 24, 
2019) [hereinafter Recommendation]. 
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UNCITRAL82 has long supplemented its hard international law on the 
enforcement of commercial arbitral awards with soft law. Since as early as 
1976, UNCITRAL promulgated a number of soft laws on the topic of com-
mercial arbitration and conciliation: there are rules on arbitration, concilia-
tion, and investor-state arbitration,83 model laws on both commercial arbitra-
tion and commercial conciliation,84 and further “explanatory texts,” such as 
texts it refers to as a Secretariat Guide, Notes, and Recommendations.85
What can soft law accomplish in this context, when hard international 
laws have failed to button down the details of arbitration and conciliation? 
To a large extent, this soft law is directed to businesses’ influence in imple-
menting the New York Convention. As noted above, the Convention is 
mostly silent on how foreign arbitration proceedings should be conducted, 
but the soft rules and model laws subsequently promulgated by UNCITRAL 
fill in these gaps. UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Rules are explicitly directed at 
private parties, and they set out best practices associated with the conduct of 
82. Recently, UNCITRAL expanded the scope of its multilateral conventions to include 
a broader range of dispute resolution. It has “hardened” its soft law on conciliation/mediation 
and produced a draft treaty on aspects of this topic. See United Nations Convention on Inter-
national Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, supra note 78. It has also begun to 
extend the reach of its arbitration treaties beyond commercial arbitration to include investor-
state arbitration. See United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-
State Arbitration, Dec. 10, 2014, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/transparency-
convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf. The Mauritius Convention has been signed by 22 
countries; although so far only 5 countries have fully ratified this convention, it has entered 
into effect. 3. United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State 
Arbitration, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
IND&mtdsg_no=XXII-3&chapter=22 (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). Investor-state arbitration is 
distinct from commercial arbitration in that the latter involves the effectuation of a purely pri-
vate agreement to arbitrate, while the former concerns arbitration between a private investor 
and a public actor, whether the state itself or some state-sponsored entity. For a discussion of 
UNCITRAL’s work on investor-state arbitration, see, for example, Anthea Roberts, Incremen-
tal, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 410
(2018); Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the 
Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 361 (2018). Because investor-state arbitration 
involves arbitration between both public and private parties, I leave discussion of this debate 
for another day.
83. See United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State 
Arbitration, supra note 82; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 77; UNCITRAL Concili-
ation Rules (1980), supra note 78.
84. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with 
Amendments Adopted (2006), supra note 77; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Com-
mercial Mediation and International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (2018),
supra note 78.
85. See, e.g., Recommendations to Assist Arbitral Institutions and Other Interested 
Bodies with Regard to Arbitrations Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), U.N.
COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/explanatorytexts/
recommendations/arbitration_rules_interested_bodies (last visited Mar. 24, 2019); Recom-
mendation, supra note 81.
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foreign arbitration and conciliation proceedings.86 Its Model Law on Com-
mercial Arbitration is directed at domestic legislatures and fulfills a similar 
gap-filling function.87
Supplementary or “gap-filling” soft law is more than non-binding inter-
national texts that pick up where the language of a related convention left 
off. Soft law on commercial arbitration, although non-binding, can influence 
private parties’ behaviors in multiple, specific ways. Parties, aware of the 
standards set out in the UNCITRAL rules, can specify in their arbitration or 
conciliation agreements that proceedings should comply with those stand-
ards set out in the rules. These parties can refer to UNCITRAL’s Arbitration 
Rules when seeking judicial recognition and enforcement of an arbitral 
award. They can seek enforcement in jurisdictions where the national courts 
have in the past looked to such rules for guidance. Moreover, parties can 
commit, contractually, to situate eventual arbitration proceedings in states 
that have enacted legislation to implement UNCITRAL’s Model Law on 
Commercial Arbitration. They can also decide against choosing to arbitrate 
in a jurisdiction that has declined to enact legislation to implement this 
model law.88
Soft laws on arbitration procedures are directed toward this private be-
havior, often explicitly.89 The role of business actors and other private par-
ties in influencing the conduct of international arbitration proceedings in-
volves the practices followed in arbitrations and in the contractual 
provisions that govern these practices.90 In the absence of soft law on the 
topic, these arbitration practices would be uncoordinated and, thus, less 
concentrated an influence. UNCITRAL’s soft laws signal both to litigants in 
private arbitrations and to the international arbitrators to which these liti-
gants direct their argument how to conduct proceedings to maximize en-
forcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention.91
Given the focus and effect of this soft law on the conduct of private ac-
tion, the involvement of private, commercial actors in the preparation of 
these soft law texts might be viewed as both to be expected and consistent 
with the legitimacy of the resulting soft law text. Private actors’ involve-
ment in the drafting of UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Rules is evident on the 
86. In its website, UNCITRAL describes the Arbitration Rules as a “comprehensive set 
of procedural rules” that “cover all aspects of the arbitral process, providing a model arbitra-
tion clause, setting out procedural rules regarding the appointment of arbitrators and the con-
duct of arbitral proceedings, and establishing rules in relation to the form, effect and interpre-
tation of the award.” UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 77.
87. As a model law, and so directed toward domestic legislatures, UNCITRAL’s Model 
Law on Commercial Arbitration also fulfills an advocacy function. 
88. Thanks are owed to Susan Franck for this point.
89. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 77, art. 1(1).
90. For an argument that these practices themselves constitute a sort of soft law, see 
Alvarez, supra note 36. 
91. Cf. Guzman & Meyer, supra note 18, at 118 (referring to coordinating effects of 
soft law but viewing this coordination as between states rather than as between private actors).
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face of this text,92 and in their attendance at the annual meeting of 
UNCITRAL’s governing commission to ratify the Rules.93 While the Rules 
are directed predominantly at the conduct of private parties, UNCITRAL’s 
Model Law on Commercial Arbitration is instead directed to domestic legis-
latures. State delegations were more involved in the drafting of the Model 
Law than the Rules, but businesses’ involvement was strong in both con-
texts. The working group charged with drafting UNCITRAL’s Model Law 
on Commercial Arbitration included observers from international associa-
tions involved directly and indirectly with the conduct of such proceed-
ings.94
2. Recognition and Enforcement of 
Other Types of Awards or Judgments
If hard, or mostly-hard, international law on the enforcement of arbitral 
awards has commanded the agreement of so many countries, what about the 
enforcement of judgments entered by domestic courts when involved in 
transnational litigation? International laws on this topic should also be rela-
tively easy to garner acceptance since they should involve a similarly lim-
ited encroachment on national sovereignty.
International and transnational organizations and similar actors have 
viewed international procedural agreements as low-hanging fruit since the 
late nineteenth century, when the first session of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law was convened.95 Optimism about the likelihood of 
reaching international consensus on topics of procedure has been mostly 
overblown.96 The Hague Conference has long promulgated conventions on 
92. See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. on the Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rules for 
Optional Use in Ad Hoc Arbitration Relating to International Trade (UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/112 (1975), reprinted in [1976] 7 Y.B. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE 
L. 157, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1976 (describing the process through which the Arbitration 
Rules were produced and referring to a handful of expert academics who worked without the 
assistance of member state delegations or a working group). 
93. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. on Its Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976), 
reprinted in [1976] 7 Y.B. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L. 157, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1976 
(included among the NGOs that attended the Commission’s annual meeting in 1976: Inter-
American Commercial Arbitration Commission; International Chamber of Commerce; Inter-
national Council for Commercial Arbitration; International Law Association).
94. See, e.g., Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Working Group on Arbitration and 
Conciliation on its Forty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/614 (2006) (included among the 
NGOs listed as attending its working group session: “Forum for International Commercial 
Arbitration (FICA), International Arbitration Institute (IAI), International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC), International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA)”).
95. See, e.g., HAROLD C. GUTTERIDGE, THE CODIFICATION OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1951) (discussing the pros and cons of PIL conventions versus codifi-
cation efforts aimed at unifying private laws).
96. See HAROLD C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
COMPARATIVE METHOD OF THE STUDY OF LAW 41–60 (1946) (noting that international 
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various aspects of international procedural law. International convergence 
mostly focuses on recognition of procedural aspects of litigation to protect
the interests of children, as well as general procedural issues such as docu-
ment recognition, evidence, and service of process.97 The Hague Conference 
has also promulgated a convention on recognition of choice of court provi-
sions in commercial agreements.98 It has not succeeded more generally, 
however, in finalizing a convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments.99
Transnational and regional agreements on the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments have been far more successful than broad international 
agreements. Nearly every country in Europe is bound in some way to either 
the Brussels and Rome Conventions100 or to the more recent EU Directives 
on these topics.101 These transnational agreements mostly center on judg-
agreement on procedural topics of “private international law” has not been reached because 
these subjects are not as apolitical as some had thought).
97. See, e.g., Conventions, Protocols and Principles, supra note 41 (listing the conven-
tions and other international instruments promulgated by the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law). The Hague Conference also acts as the depository of record for these con-
ventions in order to keep track of their entry into force and the countries bound to them. For a 
copy of “a full status report . . . showing the dates of signatures, ratifications, accessions and 
entry into force; the texts of declarations and reservations; the territorial units to which the 
Convention has been extended; the acceptances of accessions; the authorities designated,” see 
Status Chart, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/status-
charts (last visited Apr. 8, 2019). 
98. See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294. 
Although this choice of court treaty has entered into effect, only 32 countries are bound to its 
terms. See Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HAGUE CONF. ON 
PRIV. INT’L L., https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98 (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2019). This number is far fewer than those party to the New York Convention, 
but the Choice of Court Convention is far younger than the New York Convention. Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 75 (159 par-
ties to the New York Convention).
99. This is not for lack of trying. The Hague Conference has worked on its “Judgments 
Project” since at least 1992. See The Judgments Project, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L.,
https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
100. Recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial cases was orig-
inally governed within the European Economic Community by the 1968 Brussels Convention. 
See Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Sep. 27, 1968, https://curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/c-
textes/brux-idx.htm (EC). The Brussels Convention has been replaced by the Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2007 O.J. 
(L 339) 1. The Brussels Convention is often discussed in conjunction with the 1980 Rome 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 2. See gener-
ally CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION IN EUROPE (Paul Beaumont et al. eds., 2017) (providing an 
extensive analysis of the Brussels and Rome Conventions). 
101. Both the Brussels and Rome Conventions have been superseded within the EU by a 
series of regulations. See Council Regulation (EU) No. 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000, O.J. (L 12) 1 
(the first Brussels regulation) [hereinafter Brussels I]; Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1215/2012 of 12 Dec. 2012, O.J. (L 351) 1 (the recast Brussels regulation, repealing Brussels 
I) [hereinafter Brussels II]; Council Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008, O.J. (L 
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ments entered in commercial and civil proceedings rather than other types 
of proceedings.102 Broad exceptions are carved out from these European 
agreements103 (for example, insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings are not 
covered by the Brussels Regime104), although other European directives 
were later adopted to fill in some of these gaps (for example, the EU Di-
rective on Cross-Border Insolvency).105
Regional agreement on the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
have succeeded where broader international agreement has not, partly be-
cause these regional agreements are—to state the obvious—more limited in 
geographical scope. Countries are simply more willing to enter into com-
mitments to enforce foreign judgments when they understand more about 
the courts whose judgments they are committing to recognize and enforce. 
Comprehension of the consequences of an international agreement on mat-
ters of procedure can be clarified and contained where commitments of 
recognition and enforcement are coupled with agreements on which coun-
try’s courts will have jurisdiction over a particular matter and which coun-
try’s law will govern the dispute brought before such a court.106 However, 
these sorts of “triple” private international law (“PIL”) treaties are hard to 
achieve on an international, rather than simply a regional, basis. They in-
volve three times as many topics to comprehend before agreeing to sign on 
and three times as many encroachments to the sovereignty of the signing 
countries.107 These “triple” PIL treaties govern not only (i) the receiving 
court’s obligation to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, but also (ii) 
the jurisdictional reach of the court that entered that judgment and (iii) the 
177) 6 (the first Rome regulation concerning the law applicable to contractual obligations) 
[hereinafter Rome I]; see also Council Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of 11 July 2007, O.J. (L 
199) 40 (regulation applicable to non-contractual obligations, related to Rome I, and often 
referred to as Rome II).
102. See Brussels I, supra note 101, at pmbl., ¶ 7 (noting that it broadly reaches “all the 
main civil and commercial matters apart from certain well-defined matters”); Brussels II, su-
pra note 101, at pmbl., ¶ 5.
103. Brussels I, supra note 101, art. 1, ¶ 1; Brussels II, supra note 101, art. 1, ¶ 1. 
104. Brussels I, supra note 101, art. 1, ¶ 2(b); Brussels II, supra note 101, art. 1, ¶ 2(b) 
(both identically stating that the Regulation does not apply to “bankruptcy, proceedings relat-
ing to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, 
compositions and analogous proceedings”).
105. See Susan Block-Lieb, Reaching to Restructure Across Borders (Without Over-
Reaching), Even After Brexit, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 18–23 (2018) (discussing the EU Di-
rective on Cross-Border Insolvency, both as initially drafted and as more recently recast, and 
its interaction with the Brussels and Rome Regulations).
106. For a discussion of shifts in emphasis among the traditional focus on jurisdiction, 
choice of law, and enforcement, see James Fawcett, The Interrelationships of Jurisdiction and 
Choice of Law in Private International Law, 44 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 39 (1991).
107. For a discussion of the Hague Conference’s most recent work on enforcement of 
judgments, see id.
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law applicable in the decisionmaking preceding entry of that judgment.108
Bundling together international agreement on questions of jurisdiction and 
governing law make international obligations of recognition and enforce-
ment more predictable and thus more palatable, but are harder to achieve.
European directives on enforcement and recognition of judgments are 
just this type of “triple” PIL: they tie transnational agreement on the recog-
nition of judgment to commitments on jurisdiction and applicable law gov-
erning this litigation, as well as agreements to be bound to decisions of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union to construe these regional commit-
ments.109 The latter agreement ensures that European PIL treaties approach 
hard international law as defined by Abbott and Snidal, although these trea-
ties (or, later, directives) are only transnational and not international in 
scope.
Draft conventions on the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
drafted by the Hague Conference are also framed as “triple” PIL treaties. 
However, states have been negotiating a version of the convention to require 
recognition and enforcement of civil judgements in commercial litigation 
for many years, without succeeding in finalizing any draft agreement. This 
debate may come to a head at the June 2019 meeting of the Hague Confer-
ence.110 Moreover, unlike European law on PIL, there have been no pro-
posals to submit disputes over subsequent treaty interpretation to an interna-
tional court. As a result, any international convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments, whether put forward by the Hague Conference 
or not, would be subject to the same limitations as the New York Conven-
tion: it would be subject to the vagaries of national courts receiving requests 
for such enforcement.111
Recently, this log jam may have begun to disassemble with tentative 
steps toward soft laws on these topics. The Hague Conference on Private 
International Law recently published its Principles on Choice of Law on In-
108. See Ronald A. Brand, New Challenges in the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments, in THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS 
CHALLENGES (Franco Ferrari & Diego P. Fernandez Arroyo eds., forthcoming 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3246053 (“The private international law 
system has its own three pillars: jurisdiction, applicable law, and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments.”).
109. Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 2004 O.J. (C 
310) 210. See Brand, supra note 108, at 15–24 (reviewing jurisdiction, applicable law, and 
judgment recognition under European law).
110. Brand, supra note 108, at 43–44 (referring to a Hague Conference draft Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments scheduled for a diplomatic confer-
ence in June 2019, detailing the jurisdictional and other problems in this draft, and concluding 
that the negotiated result “is unlikely to work so well in a global convention subject to home-
ward trend interpretations in each Contracting State”).
111. Id.
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ternational Commercial Contracts.112 UNCITRAL promulgated its Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (“MLCBI”) in 1997,113 which loosely re-
sembles the EU Insolvency Directive114 and has been implemented by as 
many as 46 countries, including the United States and United Kingdom.115
Late in 2018, UNCITRAL also promulgated its Model Law on Recognition 
and Enforcement of Insolvency Related Judgments (“MLREIRJ”).116 These 
are certainly not hard international law as Abbott and Snidal would define 
it.117 In addition, none of these soft laws cover the breadth that a triple PIL 
treaty would have. The Choice of Law Principles would, if enacted as do-
mestic legislation, govern questions of what law should govern a dispute but 
say nothing about the jurisdictional reach of the court entering a judgment 
or the commitment of some receiving court to recognize or enforce that 
judgment. The Model Laws on insolvency proceedings and insolvency re-
lated judgments are silent on which country’s insolvency or other law 
should govern and mostly silent about questions of jurisdictional reach but 
nonetheless purport obligations of recognition and enforcement.
Why have international lawmakers turned to soft law in this context, 
and why have they set their sights so narrowly? What, if any, is the role of 
business in this turn toward soft law? In analyzing hard and soft internation-
al laws on the enforcement of arbitral awards, this Article emphasizes the 
important effects that these soft laws might have on private parties’ deci-
sions regarding the scope of their arbitration agreements, the conduct of an 
arbitration proceeding, and their decisionmaking about where (that is, in 
what state) to bring such a proceeding. In this context, soft laws on com-
mercial arbitration supplemented the New York Convention—that is, the 
hard international law on these topics.
112. Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, Mar. 
19, 2015, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=135 [hereinafter 
Hague Conference Choice of Law Principles].
113. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO 
ENACTMENT, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1997) [hereinafter MLCBI].
114. For discussion of the resemblance and distinctions between MLCBI and EU Insol-
vency Directive, see, for example, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creating International Insolven-
cy Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 570–74 (1996) .
115. Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997), U.N.
COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/cross-
border_insolvency/status (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
116. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INSOLVENCY-
RELATED JUDGMENTS (U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, 1997), https://uncitral.un.org/
sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/interim_mlij.pdf.
117. For example, not only can a national legislature add non-uniform provisions to 
these model laws when enacting legislation to implement them, both the MLCBI and 
MLREIRJ depend on national courts for interpretation of their provisions. The Hague Confer-
ence Choice of Law Principles are similarly not enforceable obligations. Although entitled 
“principles” rather than a “model law,” the Choice of Law Principles are framed in language 
precise enough for domestic enactment, as is, and indeed official commentary to these Princi-
ples invites national legislatures to do just this.
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Soft laws like the Hague Conference Choice of Law Principles and 
UNCITRAL’s insolvency model laws cannot be viewed as fulfilling a simi-
lar gap-filling purpose. None of these soft laws can be viewed as supple-
mentary to a correlative international treaty. The purpose of these stand-
alone soft laws is instead to convince domestic legislatures to enact national 
laws identical to, or at least resembling, their provisions. They fulfill an 
“advocacy” function by providing draft language that domestic legislatures 
might enact and also spelling out the arguments in favor of such enactment. 
In addition to advocacy of these public, sub-national entities, these stand-
alone soft laws may also look to convince private, commercial parties to get 
involved. Private parties can be guided by this soft law when lobbying states 
to get serious about negotiating a triple PIL commercial treaty, to be sure. 
But private, commercial actors can also contract and litigate in a way that 
would encourage a broader range of countries to enact such legislation.
The public and private advocacy functions of these soft laws work to-
gether. Although ostensibly the exclusive purpose of the Choice of Law 
Principles is to promote “party autonomy” regarding contractual choice of 
law clauses,118 this soft law alone would not bind domestic courts’ consider-
ations as to whether to enforce a contractual choice of law clause. As a re-
sult, the Hague Principles of Choice of Law may not prompt much contrac-
tual private action in the absence of domestic legislation committing to the 
enforcement of such clauses.119 As a first move, the Principles look to con-
vince national actors to press for such legislation; once that legislation is in 
place, the Principles would serve as a guide to contracting parties, to liti-
gants, and ultimately to the courts asked to enforce such clauses in the event 
of a dispute.
A similar advocacy project is implicit with UNCITRAL’s insolvency-
focused model laws. Its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency looked 
mostly to convince domestic legislatures to enact implementing legislation. 
Unlike a commercial treaty, which would only enter into force if a specified 
number of countries accede to its terms, a model law is enforceable with the 
first country’s enactment. The success of the MLCBI and MLREIRJ also 
depend on convincing private parties to contract and litigate in ways con-
sistent with their terms. In other words, UNCITRAL is betting that its 
MLCBI and MLREIRJ are “hard enough” to encourage private parties to 
choose to bring insolvency-related litigation in jurisdictions that have enact-
ed legislation to implement these model laws, but these subject matter areas 
are narrow, so the learning will be slow.
Not surprisingly, businesses and other private actors were involved in 
the drafting of these stand-alone soft laws. No empirical study of the Choice 
118. Hague Conference Choice of Law Principles, supra note 112, intro.; see also
Symeon C. Symeonides, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts: 
Some Preliminary Comments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 873, 878 (2013).
119. See Symeonides, supra note 118 (explaining that, in arbitration, both parties must 
agree on where to arbitrate, but generally plaintiffs choose where to litigate).
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of Law Principles exists, but the fingerprints of business actors are relatively 
clear—not surprisingly, considering the Principles focus exclusively on con-
tractual provisions for choosing a country’s law and private parties have 
every interest in enhancing the predictability of commercial agreements in 
this way.120 Review of background papers publicly available on the Hague 
Choice of Law Principles confirms that private actors enjoyed access to the 
project as observers, although this right of observation cannot be equated 
with influence on the project in the absence of further qualitative study. 
Having a seat at the table is only a necessary first step to influence.121 A list 
of the members of the working group charged with drafting the Hague 
Choice of Law Principles includes nineteen members—sixteen of whom 
were legal academics from around the world, in addition to two judges and 
one practicing lawyer.122 This working group was also aided by six “observ-
ers,” four of whom came from international trade associations with interests 
in the wide enforcement of choice of law clauses.123 Similarly, non-state ac-
tors’ involvement in the drafting of UNCITRAL’s MLCBI and MLREIRJ is 
also clear. Since its inception, UNCITRAL has allowed non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”) to observe its working group sessions, and NGOs 
such as the International Bar Association, INSOL International, and the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) regularly attend these sessions 
and, indeed, observations by NGOs have been constant since then.124
3. Contracts Concerning Commercial Conduct, and the 
International Laws Governing Such Contracts
Several longstanding and widely ratified treaties govern the substance 
of commercial contracts. The Hague Rules and its related Visby Protocol 
(1924 and 1968) have been ratified by more than one hundred countries and
are widely reported to represent more than ninety percent of the world’s 
120. For a discussion of the entities likely to rely on the Hague Conference Choice of 
Law Principles, see Jürgen Basedow, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law: Their Ad-
dressees and Impact, 22 UNIFORM L. REV. 304 (2017).
121. For an empirical study of attendance at UNCITRAL working group sessions prem-
ised similarly on the importance of attendance in influencing in international lawmaking, see 
Terence C. Halliday, Josh Pacewicz, & Susan Block-Lieb, Who Governs? Delegations and 
Delegates in Global Trade Lawmaking, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 279 passim (2013); BLOCK-
LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 161–92.
122. See List of Working Group Members and Observances, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV.
INT’L L., https://assets.hcch.net/docs/21d5893d-7f0d-4f4a-84cb-10d28ac643f2.pdf (last up-
dated Mar. 8, 2010).  
123. Id. (listing two observers from the International Chamber of Commerce, one from 
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association and another from the International Bar 
Association).
124. BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 50–91 (discussing the emergence of 
UNCITRAL and observations by NGOs in first Commission sessions); id. at 161–92 (empiri-
cally assessing attendance by state and non-state delegations to UNCITRAL across three 
working groups).
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trade volume.125 The UN’s Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
(1980) has been ratified by 90 countries.126 The UNIDROIT Cape Town 
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (2000) has been 
ratified by 76 countries and the EU. The UNCITRAL Convention on the 
Use of Electronic Communication in International Contracts has also en-
tered into force but is less widely acceded to than these other conventions 
(2005); it has been signed or ratified by 22 countries, but only nine countries 
fully acceded to its terms.
Each of these conventions governs a specific kind of international 
commercial contract. Except for the Cape Town Convention,127 domestic 
versions of the contracts governed by these conventions are either governed 
by commercial common law or civil codes on contract law generally. More-
over, the domestic laws that would otherwise govern the contracts now sub-
ject to the Cape Town Convention mostly resemble commercial codes, not 
regulations.128 Additionally, all of these conventions (Hague-Visby Rules; 
CISG; Cape Town Convention) pertain exclusively to transnational con-
tracts of the kind identified in these international agreements: a shipper from 
country A and carrier from country B (Hague-Visby Rules); a buyer from 
country A and seller from country B (CISG); a secured creditor claiming an 
international interest in aircraft collateral or other covered mobile equip-
125. See the Hague Rules, supra note 42. For statistics on the status of this treaty and its 
economic impact, see BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 100.
126. See CISG, supra note 43.
127. Secured transactions, including the commercial transactions creating international 
interests in mobile equipment within the scope of the Cape Town Convention, are by and 
large contractual arrangements between a borrower and lender. These secured transactions 
laws are not purely contractual, however, in that they purport to bind the borrower’s other 
creditors to the priority claimed by the lender claiming a right to security in such a contract. 
Often, domestic laws enforce the priority claimed by the lender so long as the contract satis-
fies various conditions set out in such laws and notice of the security right is made public ac-
cording to the requirements of such a law. For a more detailed discussion of the combination 
of contractual and mandatory obligations implicit in secured transactions law, see 
UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS (2007), U.N. Sales No. 
E.09.V.12 (2010). 
128. U.S. federal law—the Federal Aviation Act—governs transfers of any interest in 
certain covered aircraft, including financing interests such as a financial lease, conditional 
title, or other security rights. Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 44107–44109 (2012). Article 
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs other personal property collateral under U.S. law. 
U.C.C. § 9-109 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). Other codes based on article 
9, like the Personal Property Security Acts adopted in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, or 
codes enacted in civil law jurisdictions to govern security rights or contract law more general-
ly similarly govern personal property collateral of various sorts. See, e.g., Anthony Duggan & 
Michael Gedye, Personal Property Security Law Reform in Australia and New Zealand: The
Impetus for Change, 27 PA. ST. INT’L L. REV. 655, 656 (2009) (tracing the reform of Australi-
an secured transactions laws as relates to earlier similar laws in New Zealand, Canada, and the 
United States).
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ment and extending credit on the basis of this collateral to a borrower from 
country B (Cape Town Convention).129
As with international conventions on matters of procedure, some of this 
hard international law has also been supplemented with soft international 
law, although the combination of hard and soft international law is not uni-
form across all these subject matter areas.130 For example, UNCITRAL’s 
Convention on the International Sales of Goods has been “supplemented” 
by UNIDROIT’s Principles on International Commercial Contracts.131
The previous sections demonstrate that soft international laws supple-
mented treaties on enforcement of litigation and arbitral awards for different 
reasons.132 The New York Convention is surrounded by supplementary, gap-
filling soft law that has become incrementally harder. The Hague Confer-
ence’s Choice of Law Principles were promulgated because working group 
participants viewed the prospect of hard law on the topic to be unlikely in 
the short-to-medium term; the working group expressed its hope that this 
soft law text would convince domestic legislatures to enact national laws 
modeled on the Principles and direct enforcement of choice of law claus-
es.133
UNIDROIT’s International Commercial Contract Principles (“ICC 
Principles”) fulfill both gap-filling and advocacy soft law purposes. The In-
troduction to the ICC Principles describes them as providing a “non-
legislative means of the unification or harmonization of law” intended to 
resemble the American Law Institute Restatement projects.134 The ICC Prin-
129. See supra text accompanying nn. 67–68.
130. For example, the breadth of the Cape Town Convention has expanded since it first 
entered into effect in 2000. Rather than accomplish this expansion through gap-filling soft 
laws, UNIDROIT instead relied on a hub-and-spoke mechanism that links protocols govern-
ing narrow sorts of mobile equipment types—such as aircraft, rail and rolling stock, spacecraft 
and satellites, and mining and agricultural equipment—with the general provisions contained 
in the Cape Town Convention. For a discussion of this “hub-and-spoke” approach to the Cape 
Town Convention, see, e.g., Goode, supra note 68, passim; Jeffrey Wool, The Next Genera-
tion of International Aviation Finance Law: An Overview of the Proposed UNIDROIT Con-
vention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment as Applied to Aircraft Equipment, 20 
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 499, 509–10 (1999). For a discussion of business interests in promot-
ing the design of the Cape Town Convention, see Durkee, supra note 2, at 292–97.
131. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (INT’L INST. FOR THE 
UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, 2016). UNIDROIT’s Principles were issued in 1994 and have 
been supplemented over time (2000, 2010, 2016). For other examples of soft law in the inter-
stice of international commercial treaties, see U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 
UNCTAD/ICC Rules for Multimodal Transport Documents, U.N. Doc. 
TRADE/WP.4/INF.117/Corr.1 (Jan. 7, 1992).
132. Compare text associated with supra nn. 75–94 (discussing the gap-filling function 
of soft law in the context of enforcement of arbitral awards), with text associated with supra 
nn. 95–125 (discussing the advocacy function of soft law on the enforcement and recognition 
of judgments).
133. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, pmbl., June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294; 
see also Symeonides, supra note 118.
134. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS at vii.
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ciples make clear that UNIDROIT directs this text, in true soft law fashion, 
to a wide range of national lawmakers, such as legislators and courts, so that 
they might implement its recommendations in their domestic law (whether 
common law or civil codes) and practices.135 The ICC Principles are also di-
rected to private parties, whether those litigating before national courts or 
drafting various clauses for inclusion in their international contracts.136 To 
clarify this message to contracting parties, UNIDROIT also couples its ICC 
Principles with standardized contract clauses for parties’ use.137
Although the ICC Principles are directed both toward public and private 
actors, private actors were mostly involved in the drafting. The working 
groups involved in drafting these Principles included academics, practition-
ers, and judges.138 Perhaps more tellingly, the ICC Principles were drafted 
by experts and ratified by UNIDROIT’s governing council but did not re-
ceive formal approval from UNIDROIT’s member states.139 UNDROIT’s 
approach to the ICC Principles—that is, its failure to seek formal approval 
from member states—resembles that followed in its Principles of Reinsur-
ance Contracts140 but is distinct from that of its other soft law projects, such 
as UNIDROIT’s Principles on the Operation of Close-Out Netting Provi-
sions, which were prepared by a working group, approved by the governing 
council, and subsequently ratified by creating a group of “governmental ex-
perts.”141 States’ involvement in the drafting of the Close-Out Netting Prin-
135. Id. at pmbl. (“These Principles set forth general rules for international commercial 
contracts. They shall be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed 
by them. They may be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed by
general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or the like. They may provide a solution to an 
issue raised when it proves impossible to establish the relevant rule of the applicable law. 
They may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform law instruments. They may 
serve as a model for national and international legislators.”).
136. Id.
137. Model Clauses for the Use of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commer-
cial Contracts, INT’L INST. FOR UNIFICATION PRIV. L., 
https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/commercial-contracts/upicc-model-clauses (last updated 
Jan. 30, 2017).
138. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS at xiii–xiv.
139. Id. Although their motivation in drafting the ICC Principles in this way is not per-
fectly clear, UNIDROIT might have been motivated by UNCITRAL’s experience in drafting 
its Arbitration Rules, which also were originally promulgated without the political imprimatur 
of member states. See supra nn. 92–94.
140. The UNIDROIT Principles of Reinsurance Contracts are incomplete, although it 
expects this work to be finished by 2019. For discussion of the purpose and working methods 
followed in preparing the Reinsurance Principles, see Study L – Formulation of Principles of 
Reinsurance Contracts, INT’L INST. FOR UNIFICATION PRIV. L., 
https://www.unidroit.org/work-in-progress/reinsurance-contracts (last updated May 8, 2018). 
141. See Principles on the Operation of Close-Out Netting Provisions, INT’L INST. FOR 
UNIFICATION PRIV. L., https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/netting (last up-
dated Dec. 11, 2013). For detail on UNIDROIT’s preparatory work preceding its Governing 
Council’s ratification of the Close-Out Netting Principles, see Study LXXVIII C - UNIDROIT 
Principles on the Operation of Close-Out Netting Provisions - Preparatory Work, INT’L INST.
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ciples may be the result of the market-wide public interest in the enforce-
ment of these financial contracts, confirmed perhaps by UNIDROIT’s mul-
tiple texts on this and related subjects.142
4. Regulation of Commercial Conduct, and 
International Laws on Such Regulation
National commercial regulation has expanded to address a wider range 
of issues over the course of the twentieth and now twenty-first centuries, in-
cluding consumer protection regulation, environmental regulation, intellec-
tual property regimes, and regulation of securities and other financial mar-
kets. As a result, international actors face increasing pressures to enter into 
international agreements on some of the topics subject to these regula-
tions.143 Treaties on regulatory issues present greater sovereignty concerns 
than those concerning contracts and other voluntary agreements. As argued 
above, international agreement on commercial regulation treads on the sov-
ereignty interests of countries in three ways: the authority of domestic legis-
latures to enact regulation; the authority of executive branches to design, 
implement, and enforce such regulation; and the competence of courts to 
interpret and enforce these laws.144 International commercial regulation of 
this sort would stomp fully on states’ sovereign feet, not just a toe here and 
there.
As might be expected, conventions—hard international laws—on com-
mercial regulation are relatively rare and mostly govern purely international 
transactions. Hard international commercial regulation is thus both rare and 
limited in scope. Yet, increasingly, global lawmakers (and other internation-
al organizations focused on law as the solution to problems of transnational 
scale) have proposed international law projects aimed at changing commer-
cial and other local behaviors; have proposed international regulation to ac-
complish such changes; and have focused their international calls for reform 
at the substance of domestic legislation.
This increased demand for commercial and financial law reform is the 
consequence of several epochal events beginning in the last decades of the 
twentieth century. First, the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent demise of 
the Soviet Union meant that a dozen or so former Soviet satellite countries 
FOR UNIFICATION PRIV. L., https://www.unidroit.org/netting-preparatory-work (describing the 
work of the “study group” and “committee of governmental experts”) (last updated July 15, 
2014). 
142. UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities, 
Oct. 9, 2009, https://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/2009intermediatedsecurities/
convention.pdf; see also UNIDROIT LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES
(2017), https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/legislative-guide.
143. For discussion of these pressures, see THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF SOFT LAW, supra note 35; Delimatsis, supra
note 33, at 286–87.
144. See supra Section III.A.
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needed to rewrite their civil codes and other legislation to allow for private 
ownership of property and transfers of such ownership, contracting, the 
formation of corporations and other legal persons, regulation of banks and 
capital markets, and so on. These reform initiatives were mostly concentrat-
ed regionally and assisted by acceptance of most of these countries into the 
European Union.
Proposals for international regulation also proliferated, second, as a 
consequence of the two past global financial crises. Clubs of nations, inter-
national financial institutions, and other international organizations first re-
acted to the Asian financial crisis with proposals to raise the level of the 
global financial architecture.145 The G-22 promoted its global financial ar-
chitecture project as a means of preventing future financial crises.146 In a se-
ries of reports published in 1999, the G-22 proposed that its “member” 
countries—the twenty-two systemically significant economies of the 
world—should reform a lengthy list of financial and economic regulations, 
including: banking regulation; capital markets regulations; regulations of 
securities and related financial laws; accounting standards; standards for 
corporate insolvency laws; and so on.147 The global financial architecture 
project impelled numerous IOs, including several global lawmakers, to en-
gage in designing and promulgating international commercial and financial 
law reforms. By 2009, when ahistorical levels of default in subprime mort-
gage markets in the United States began to unravel and undermine financial 
markets more broadly, the financial architecture project was nowhere near 
complete. However, it grew in importance. The G-8 and G-20 circled back 
to the need for strengthening the global financial architecture as a means of 
tempering the worst effects of the emerging global financial crisis.148 The 
list of financial and commercial regulation that these clubs of nations pro-
posed to internationalize was lengthened, which meant that the list of com-
mercial and financial actors’ behaviors that should be examined and poten-
tially changed also grew longer.
Both monumental shifts in the global political economy prompted de-
mand for reform of international laws governing private, commercial con-
duct as well as internationally-coordinated reform of national laws govern-
ing commercial and financial markets. To be clear, this was more than 
simply an increase in the quantity of international law reform proposals. 
These were also qualitatively distinct proposals: to “make,” not simply 
“find,” commercial laws to govern existing commercial practices; to craft 
mandatory rules and mandates that would alter commercial conduct; and for 
at least some of this law to be reformed simultaneously as applied both to 
international and purely domestic commercial transactions.
145. HALLIDAY & CARRUTHERS, supra note 16; BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 
1, at 121–25.
146. BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 122.
147. See Block-Lieb, supra note 55.
148. Cho & Kelly, supra note 55, at 493.
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In implementing these proposals on commercial and financial regula-
tion, global lawmakers have mostly relied on soft international law. For ex-
ample, UNCITRAL’s work on setting standards for corporate insolvency 
laws has resulted in the production of more than a handful of soft law texts: 
two draft model laws, a legislative guide with several parts published over 
multiple years, and one practice guide.149 Suggestions for a multilateral trea-
ty on cross-border insolvency practice have mostly been rebuffed.150
UNCITRAL’s work on secured transactions law reforms also involves only 
soft law instruments.151 In addition, UNCITRAL is not alone in drafting in-
ternational regulations as soft laws. The Financial Stability Board (“FSB”), 
working on its own or partnering with the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”), has promulgated reports, high-level 
principles, and other soft law texts on a wide range of financial topics. Vari-
ous transnational regulatory networks and international professional asso-
ciations have furthered the work of the FSB and the OECD by publishing 
related supplementary texts on these issues. Over time, the G-20 has en-
dorsed dozens of these high-level principles.152 As a result, a wide range 
of soft international laws now exists in these contexts, including 
corporate governance,153 regulation of the securities and capital 
markets,154 and the financial institutions engaged in these markets.155
149. See e.g., UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 72;
UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW: PART THREE: TREATMENT OF 
ENTERPRISE GROUPS IN INSOLVENCY, supra note 72; UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON 
INSOLVENCY LAW: PART FOUR: DIRECTORS’ OBLIGATIONS IN THE PERIOD APPROACHING 
INSOLVENCY, supra note 72.
150. UN Commission on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) 
on Its Forty-Fifth Session, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/803 (May 6, 2014).
151. See, e.g., UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, supra
note 127; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with 
Amendments Adopted (2006), supra note 77.
152. See, e.g., G20 HIGH-LEVEL PRINCIPLES FOR DIGITAL FINANCIAL INCLUSION
(2016), https://www.gpfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/G20%20High%20Level%20
Principles%20for%20Digital%20Financial%20Inclusion%20-%20Full%20version-.pdf. 
153. For a discussion of the wide range of soft international law on topics of corporate 
governance, see, for example, Klaus J. Haupt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State 
of the Art and International Regulation, (ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, Law Working 
Paper No. 170/2011, 2011); Dimity Kingsford Smith, Governing the Corporation: The Role of 
‘Soft Regulation,’ 35 U.N.S.W. L.J. 378 (2012); VERONIQUE MAGNIER, COMPARATIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES passim (2017). For a comparative discus-
sion of national perspectives on corporate governance, see, for example, Martin Gelter, Com-
parative Corporate Governance: New and Old, in UNDERSTANDING THE COMPANY:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THEORY 37 (Barnali Choudhury & Martin Petrin eds., 2017).
154. For a discussion of the emergence and complications involving soft international 
laws on the regulation of securities markets, see, for example, Chris Brummer, Post-American 
Securities Regulation, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 327 (2010); Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, 
The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883 (2009). For a 
comparison of national laws on securities regulation, see, for example, GLOBAL SECURITIES 
LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT (Pierre-Henri Conac & Martin Gelter eds., 2018).
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Why has UNCITRAL promulgated only soft international law on cor-
porate insolvency law standards? Do UNCITRAL’s goals for the production 
of soft law regarding regulation governing insolvency proceedings differ 
from the goals of the G-20 in promoting its global architecture project?
UNCITRAL describes its initial Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 
and the multiple supplements to this Guide as the end of the road as far as 
international lawmaking goes; it has not proposed engaging in further work 
in the area, for example, by drafting a model law on the substantive corpo-
rate insolvency law.156 However, this does not mean that the Insolvency 
Guide should not be viewed as advocating legislative enactment. Similar to 
what the Hague Conference revealed in its publication of Choice of Law 
Principles, UNCITRAL aims to speak directly to domestic legislatures and 
to persuade them to enact domestic insolvency laws resembling the contents 
of its Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law.
The G-20 has a different goal in mind. Through this international eco-
nomic forum, the most economically powerful nations work together to in-
fluence networks of transaction regulators so that their actions (whether 
regulatory or enforcement conduct) converge with those set out in various 
high-level principles.157 Domestic legislation is beside the point. As Chris 
Brummer argues, no one national regulator can be expected to “single-
handedly impose its will globally on all actors, all the time, and on its own” 
given the increasingly globalized financial markets subject to such regula-
tion.158 As a result, he argues, international decisionmaking became a “‘ver-
tically’ integrated regulatory system.”159 It has soft laws “serving as a build-
ing block and focal point for coordination” that assist in creating “patterns 
of relationships” among heads of states, national regulatory agencies, inter-
national financial institutions, inter-governmental organizations, and non-
155. For a discussion of transnational regulatory networks of financial regulators and the 
soft laws they have promulgated and implemented, see INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
AND SOFT LAW, supra note 35; BRUMMER, supra note 35; Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law 
Dominates International Finance—and not Trade, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 623 (2011); Weiss 
and Kammel, supra note 35; Hissane Cissé, Alternatives to “Hard” Law in International Fi-
nancial Regulation: The Experience of the World Bank, 106 ASIL PROCEEDINGS 320 (2012).
156. UNCITRAL prepared three model laws on the topic of insolvency, but all of these 
are procedural. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
INSOLVENCY-RELATED JUDGMENTS (U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, 1997), 
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/interim_
mlij.pdf; MLCBI, supra note 113; see also John A. E. Pottow, The Dialogic Aspect of Soft 
Law in International Insolvency: Discord, Digression, and Development, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L.
479 (2019). In this way, UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law should be dis-
tinguished from its Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, see supra note 127, which has 
subsequently been followed by a Model Law on Secured Transactions. UNCITRAL MODEL 
LAW ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS (U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, 2016). 
157. See, e.g., BRUMMER, supra note 35, at 73 (discussing the G-20 and the “range of 
legislative products” they put out, “including communiques and declarations”).
158. BRUMMER, supra note 35, at 61.
159. Id. at 115.
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state organizations.160 Soft laws work in this context—they affect and even 
alter behaviors in complex financial markets—because they offer opportuni-
ties for “socializing” transnational networks of actors and thus institutional-
izing their conduct and practices.161
Distinct from gap-filling soft laws like UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Rules 
and Model Law on Commercial Arbitration and UNIDROIT’s ICC Princi-
ples, and distinct from the soft law advocacy implicit in the Hague Confer-
ence’s Choice of Law Principles, the G-20’s high-level principles and 
UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide are, thus, intended to prompt dialogue 
among international, national, and local actors. Open-ended recommenda-
tions or high-level principles drafted by IOs such as UNCITRAL or the FSB 
produce a sort of “check list” that invites review of country practices by na-
tional actors.162 To some extent, this check list intends to be diagnostic, 
though it prompts self-diagnosis rather than the more “top-down” judgment 
that may engender sovereign nations, whether powerful or weak, to bridle at 
the intrusion.163
The influence of business actors and associations on the drafting of cor-
porate insolvency law standards and in the drafting and implementation of 
this soft international law on regulated financial markets and transactions is 
now well-established. Halliday and I observed UNCITRAL’s work on the 
Insolvency Guide in real time and over many years.164 We found considera-
ble involvement in that process by a range of international professional as-
sociations, including the International Bar Association, American Bar Asso-
160. Id. at 116.
161. See, e.g., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 16, at 19 (describing “net-
works” of “regulators, busineses, and civil society actors” participating “in social contexts 
beyond the nation-state” and noting that “[p]articipants in these networks act as intermediaries 
among local, national, and transnational governance arenas.”) (citation omitted). This “social-
izing” may well assist in the institutionalization of TLOs. See id. at 51 (defining “institutional-
ization” as occurring “when relevant actors clearly understand which norms apply in what 
situations and which behaviors will be considered in conformity with those norms.”).
162. For a discussion of the working methods of the Financial Stability Board, see, for 
example, Michael S. Barr, Who’s In Charge of Global Finance?, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 971, 
1004 (2014) (“The principal mechanism by which a level playing field and intergovernmental 
accountability are achieved is peer review—a process that ‘produces social pressures, which 
in turn shapes judgments as to whether or not to conform to a given standard.’ ”).
163. Other soft law texts, like those promulgated by the World Bank or the regional de-
velopment banks, are sometimes framed as “diagnostic” aids to assist Bank staff in conduct-
ing country reviews or to aid domestic ministries of justice in drafting national legislation. For 
a guide to the contents of such texts, see JOSÉ GUILHERME REIS & THOMAS FAROLE, TRADE 
COMPETITIVENESS DIAGNOSTIC TOOLKIT (2012). These diagnostic tools directly provide a 
sort of check list for staff working on behalf of these international financial institutions 
(“IFIs”), but, because these diagnostic tools are made publicly available, states, too, can ac-
cess the check lists in an effort to excel when diagnostic work subsequently gets done by IFI 
staff. 
164. BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 1.
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ciation, INSOL International, and International Insolvency Institute,165 alt-
hough no trade groups.166 This access by professional associations is distinct 
from capture in that we also observed a strong Secretariat at UNCITRAL 
that repeatedly protected member and observer state delegations from con-
duct by non-state actors that crossed the line.167 Indeed, state delegations
were aware of the close working relationship between members of the Sec-
retariat and delegates in various non-state delegations. When France raised 
objections to UNCITRAL regarding these “methods of work,” member 
states ultimately reaffirmed their support for the assistance that these “ex-
perts” provided to the international civil servants.168
Halliday and I have not observed the workings of the FSB or OECD, on 
the other hand, and there is limited empirical study of these “black box-
es.”169 Nonetheless, several general observations are worth making in this 
context. Because the substance of this soft international law involves com-
mercial and financial practices that are regulated at the national level or are 
in some sense subject to mandatory legislation, we should presume that 
businesses have already sought to influence this regulation at the national 
level through lobbying and related activities. As noted above, international 
lawmaking may provide businesses with a “second bite at the regulated ap-
ple” and, depending on the market interests at stake with this sort of interna-
tional regulation, may prompt businesses’ efforts to seek to reverse the ef-
fects of national regulation.170 But self-regulatory organizations have not 
165. Id. at 187 (noting that “professionals played outsized roles in the inner core of 
lawmakers [within UNCITRAL]. Delegations of professionals (International Bar Association, 
INSOL International, American Bar Association, International Insolvency Institute) to the 
Insolvency Working Group were arguably the critical technical drivers of that deliberative 
process.”).
166. For a discussion of the absence of business or financial actors or associations—
despite the presence of their proxies in the form of insolvency professionals (that is, interna-
tional organizations of such professionals), see Terence Halliday, Susan Block-Lieb, & Bruce 
Carruthers, Missing Debtors: National Lawmaking and Global Norm-Making of Corporate 
Bankruptcy Regimes, in A DEBTOR WORLD 236 (Ralph Brubaker et al. eds., 2012).
167. BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 204 (“All working group secretaries 
and most participants contest the characterization of an ‘expert group as a smoke-filled 
room.’ ”).
168. BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at ch. 8.
169. For a tentative study of the global financial architecture project, see FIN. STABILITY 
BD., IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE G20 FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORMS: 28
NOV. 2014 4TH ANNUAL REPORT (2018), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/
P281118-1.pdf.
170. Cf. Melissa J. Durkee, Astroturf Activism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 201, 204 (2017) (argu-
ing that “businesses are able to secretly gain access to international officials” because rules of 
international access to IOs are unsophisticated and in need of reform); Shaffer & Pollack, su-
pra note 9, at 765–84 (describing soft law produced in the context of powerful states that 
agree on a common policy, powerful states that disagree, and weak states that disagree, find-
ing complementary soft law strategies in the case of agreement between powerful states but 
antagonistic strategies in other cases; adding businesses’ interests to the mix only heightens 
the likelihood of such antagonism).
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drafted these soft laws alone; organizations of numerous sub-state actors, 
such as national regulators, have joined with inter-governmental organiza-
tions to reach consensus through a procedure described as “socializing” 
along a “vertically-integrated regulatory system.”171 It is hard to imagine 
capture by business actors of such a diffuse network of actors, but, of 
course, it is difficult to observe hundreds of “black boxes” and that may be 
precisely the goal of such fragmentation.
C. A Return to the Big Picture
Soft laws play important roles in the development of international 
commercial law—some complementary and some antagonistic. Rather than 
simply focusing on interactions between hard and soft international laws, or 
on consensus or dissensus among states’ interests in such laws, this Article 
looked at the involvement and influence of business interests in the making 
of international commercial law and particularly at the role soft laws play in 
this context.
In the realm of international commercial and financial law, soft laws 
play at least three distinct roles: gap-filling, advocacy, and socializing. Iden-
tification of these roles is not itself novel,172 but discussion of them through 
the lens of business influence’s impact on these functions does lend a dis-
tinct perspective. Although we may discuss these functions without refer-
ence to businesses’ access to international efforts to craft agreed-upon 
standards for conduct in global commercial and financial markets, this dis-
cussion would ignore an important reality: Just as “business entities have 
become deeply involved in designing, negotiating, and implementing a 
number of treaties in the private law,”173 they are also embedded in design-
ing, negotiating, and implementing the soft law governing international 
commercial law.174 Private, commercial actors’ involvement is not limited, 
moreover, to the process of global lawmaking itself; businesses and the pro-
fessionals, professional associations, and IOs that represent their interests 
are also engaged, after the fact, both in terms of incremental work to “hard-
en” these soft standards in subsequent rounds of lawmaking and in imple-
menting these standards with practices “on the ground.” Although sovereign 
states might be expected to focus on the absence of obligation in soft inter-
national law, regardless of its function, autonomous, non-state actors are 
more likely to emphasize soft laws’ effectiveness in coordinating activity, 
its flexibility in the face of changing markets, technology and the resulting 
171. BRUMMER, supra note 35, at 115 (“Broad-based and more-political institutions set 
agendas and assess gaps, whereas more-technocratic sectoral and specialist standards setters 
promulgate best practices and, in some instances, granularized rules.”).
172. See, e.g., Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 722–27.
173. Durkee, supra note 2, at 266 (emphasis added).
174. See supra Part III.
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political economy, and the legitimacy it provides in validating otherwise 
purely private action.175
When businesses seek to influence the adoption and implementation of 
gap-filling soft international laws, they bring their distinct capabilities to the 
table. Gap-filling soft laws are understood to extend the subject matter reach 
of pre-existing hard law instruments with reference to topics implicated in a 
treaty but left unsaid. The drafting of gap-filling soft laws involves the 
drafting of more precise detail and information that got left out of the treaty 
in order to ensure international agreement on an enforceable obligation. To 
emphasize gap-filling soft laws merely as producing greater detail in the in-
ternational commercial law on a topic is to focus solely on the implementa-
tion of this form of soft law through the subsequent production of some 
harder sort of international law. Yet businesses hold a distinct edge in the 
implementation of gap-fillers in that this sort of soft law often is relied on 
by private parties in constructing their contracts and possibly also in stand-
ardized networks of contracts. UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Rules, for exam-
ple, set unenforceable standards for the conduct of arbitration proceedings. 
This guidance may thereafter become enforceable when the contents of the 
Rules are incorporated into arbitration clauses in private contracts. The con-
tracts themselves are enforceable under national laws of general application, 
while the arbitral awards that result from the arbitration proceedings com-
mitted to in such contracts are themselves likely to be enforced as a result of 
the New York Convention.
Private actors’ involvement and influence also affect the implementa-
tion of soft law intended to prompt socializing an area of financial regulato-
ry law.176 To be sure, soft laws on the conduct of central banking practices 
will mostly be socialized by public actors charged with regulating these 
functions under national laws.177 But, to a varying degree across national 
regulatory landscapes, private actors’ involvement may well be critical to 
the success of the socializing of the global standards set out in soft interna-
tional law, especially where central banking functions are held by private 
banks or where self-regulation governs financial markets. Public and private 
actors coordinate their interactions through IOs with “highly developed” 
175. For a more general discussion of the interaction of public and private incentives in 
international lawmaking, see Jürgen Basedow, The State’s Private Law and the Economy 
Commercial Law as an Amalgam of Public and Private Rule-Making, 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
703, 719 (2008) (looking to “identify the conditions that favor the emergence of private rules 
as well as those that make state law indispensable.”).
176. For a discussion of the concept of “modeling” and the interaction of epistemic 
communities of like-minded actors, see BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 19, at 539; see 
also Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 726 (discussing the importance of Braithwaite and 
Drahos to understanding the complementary relationship between hard and soft international 
law and regulation).
177. Barr, supra note 162, at 992 (detailing the working methods of the Financial Stabil-
ity Board as involving both development of independent reports and “ensuring global compli-
ance” in part through “peer reviews on a country-by-country and regional basis”).
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governance structures.178 Together the “vertically-integrated regulatory sys-
tem” that Brummer likens the global financial architecture project to may 
work on three distinct levels, as suggested by Transnational Legal Order 
theory:179 it may vertically link international and transnational organizations 
not only to national regulators but also commercial and financial entities 
“on the ground.”180 While socializing soft laws may interact with existing, or 
lead toward eventual, hard international laws, they need not. Where the so-
cializing occurs among tightly bound epistemic communities of actors, there 
is little need for the formal obligations that hard law would bring. Their 
commonalties converge action toward a singular goal despite the absence of 
a credible threat of enforcement.
Finally, soft laws aimed at advocating the need for further international 
or national laws on a topic may also rely on a combination of public and 
private action. The Hague Conference promulgated its Choice of Law Prin-
ciples as soft law and not as a draft treaty because preliminary work on the 
topic convinced the Conference that the time was not ripe for such a con-
vention. It also promulgated the Principles because, notwithstanding this 
lack of state interest in pursuing the topic, private parties and organizations 
representing various business interests persisted in the commercial benefits 
of predictable enforcement of contract clauses choosing the applicable gov-
erning law. This divergence between states’ sovereign and businesses’ au-
tonomous interests were negotiated through the soft law format.181
178. BRUMMER, supra note 35, at 116 (“Despite their soft law foundations, the standard-
setting bodies that drive standard setting and international agendas typically possess highly 
developed institutional structures, each with its own mix of membership rules, decision rules, 
and decision-making processes.”).
179. For a discussion of the international, national, and local coordination and concord-
ance envisioned by TLO theory, see TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 16, at 42–
48.
180. See, e.g., Eric Helleiner, Regulating the Regulators: The Emergence and Limits of 
the Transnational Financial Legal Order, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 
16, at 231–57, 249 (“Major shifts in the content of regulation in the period – including the 
new emphasis on ‘macroprudential’ regulatory philosophy – can be attributed in large part to 
new ideas and consensus formation among experts in transgovernmental networks, many of 
which have become more skeptical of neo-liberal ideas in finance, as well as of transnational 
private lobbying.”) (citation omitted); Carola Westermeier, The Bank of International Settle-
ments as a Think Tank for Financial Policy-Making, 37 POL’Y & SOC’Y 170, 183 (2018) (ana-
lyzing the Bank of International Settlements both “as a host to central bankers, financial poli-
ticians and other actors in financial governance and as a provider of knowledge to these 
networks”).
181. Advocacy through soft law can be both positive (pressing for the subsequent adop-
tion of some harder international law) and negative (making the case for revisions to or rever-
sals from existing international law instruments). For examples and analysis of antagonistic 
soft international laws, see Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 788–98.
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Conclusion
Empirical research increasingly demonstrates that businesses’ influence 
on international commercial law may involve more than simply pressing the 
State Department or a foreign ministry to pursue their interests in interna-
tional negotiations. In the wake of these findings, this Article sought to “up-
date” theoretical understanding regarding the primacy of states’ involve-
ment in the making and implementation of international law by focusing on 
one sort of international law—specifically, international commercial law. 
The Article explored the role that businesses and other private actors play in 
the construction and implementation of these international texts. In theoriz-
ing about private, commercial actors’ roles in these processes, it emphasized 
and compared the distinct interests and abilities of public and private actors 
in the choice between hard and soft international law.
The conventional way to conceive of business access in the lawmaking 
context is as lobbying or legislative influence. With this depiction, domestic 
businesses press the state in which they reside to design international 
agreements on topics of commercial law consistent with their commercial 
interests. But, while commercial actors may well look to influence global 
lawmaking in this way, indirectly through the portal of state action, studies 
show that businesses also make their transnational commercial interests 
known more directly to global lawmakers. That businesses exercise their 
influence in both national and international settings suggests that hard and 
soft international laws can serve a distinct purpose for states than for busi-
nesses, depending on the type of international commercial law at issue. It 
also suggests that the decision to promulgate soft or hard international 
commercial laws may not depend exclusively on state-centric factors or on 
commercial interests filtered through a state’s perception of its national in-
terests.
Although international law is conventionally divided between public 
and private, between procedural and substantive, this Article described 
commercial law as falling into a three-part typology: (i) judicial enforce-
ment of private contracts, judgments, or arbitral awards; (ii) “bottom up” 
legislative codification of commercial practices; and (iii) “top down” regu-
lation of commerce. When viewed this way, the role of business in influenc-
ing the production of international commercial law should not be limited to 
consideration of activities that resemble lobbying. This sort of influence 
pertains to legislative or regulatory proposals, but not all commercial law is 
regulatory in format. Businesses may exert influence through contracts, in-
cluding networks of standardized contracts, and through their dispute reso-
lution practices, including transnational litigation. These additional forms of 
business influence on commercial law deserve distinct consideration.
This Article identified three purposes of soft international commercial 
law: gap-filling; advocacy, and socializing functions. It linked soft law’s 
gap-filling function to international laws that resemble common law or code 
approaches in domestic commercial law. Its socializing function, by con-
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trast, was applied predominantly to regulatory commercial law contexts in 
that soft law can guide TRNs of regulators and civil society toward consen-
sus on a desired range of administrative practices. Soft law advocacy looks 
not only to plan for subsequent lawmaking within international organiza-
tions but also at national and local decisionmaking: domestic legislators, 
domestic courts, and others involved in the design and conduct of dispute 
resolution mechanisms.
States may object less to the influence of private interests in the context 
of soft international commercial law than hard law. Soft international law 
may look redundant or harmless because it is not “legalized” according to 
Abbott and Snidal. Yet, perhaps states should be warier of business inter-
ests’ access to the making of soft international laws, although soft laws lack 
legalization. Resolution of the divergences between state and non-state in-
terests by means of soft law channels may obscure business influence, mak-
ing it harder to detect, and that may be the point.

